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Just Listening: The Equal Hearing Principle and the 
Moral Life of Judges 
Barry Sullivan* 
“[T]o regard law only as a game is to forget that in the process human 
opportunities and liberties and life itself may be taken.”1 
 
“[O]nly a novel would do justice to justice as it sat in front of me, full 
of both charm and steel, ready to discuss the law in practice and in 
theory.”2 
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INTRODUCTION 
In Laird v. Tatum, then-Justice William H. Rehnquist famously 
declined to recuse himself in a case involving the constitutionality of a 
controversial domestic spying program—an issue with which he had been 
intimately involved, and about which he had spoken publicly, as an 
executive branch lawyer.3  In a spirited defense of his refusal to recuse, 
Justice Rehnquist wrote: “Proof that a Justice’s mind at the time he joined 
the Court was a complete tabula rasa in the area of constitutional 
adjudication would be evidence of lack of qualification, not lack of 
bias.”4  The point is an important one.  Clearly, we do not think that 
judges can or should approach their cases with minds that are wholly 
unformed.5 
 
3. Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 824–29 (1972) (memorandum opinion of Rehnquist, J.).  The 
underlying case involved an action for declaratory and injunctive relief concerning the 
constitutionality of an Army surveillance program aimed at allegedly “lawful and peaceful civilian 
political activity.”  See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 2 (1972) (holding that “respondents [had not] 
presented a justiciable controversy in complaining of a ‘chilling’ effect on the exercise of their First 
Amendment rights where such effect [was] allegedly caused, not by any ‘specific action of the 
Army against them, [but] only [by] the existence and operation of the intelligence gathering and 
distributing system, which [was] confined to the Army and related civilian investigative 
agencies’”).  In an opinion by Chief Justice Burger, the Court held that the plaintiffs had failed to 
establish a justiciable controversy by alleging that the “mere existence” of a counter-intelligence 
program had a “chilling effect” on the exercise of First Amendment rights.  Id. at 12–16.  Four 
Justices dissented, with Justice Rehnquist providing the deciding vote. 
4. Laird, 409 U.S. at 835.  Justice Rehnquist further explained: 
Since most Justices come to this bench no earlier than their middle years, it would be 
unusual if they had not by that time formulated some tentative notions which would 
influence them in their interpretation of the sweeping clauses of the Constitution and 
their interaction with one another.  It would be not merely unusual, but extraordinary, if 
they had not at least given opinions as to constitutional issues in their previous legal 
careers. 
Id. at 834.  Of course, Justice Rehnquist’s defense may seem somewhat self-serving and beside the 
point.  His critics were not suggesting that a judge’s mind should be perfectly blank, and his views 
on the issue could hardly be described as “tentative notions.”  Id. at 835.  See MONROE H. 
FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS 216–21 (4th ed. 2010) 
(discussing Justice Rehnquist’s position in Laird v. Tatum); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Chief William’s 
Ghost: The Problematic Persistence of the Duty to Sit, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 813, 851–63 (2009) 
(same). 
5. To begin with, most American judges are professionally trained.  In our system, as a general 
matter, that means that they will have been trained as common law lawyers and may therefore be 
expected to approach their cases from the perspective of lawyers trained in that tradition.  For such 
lawyers, some arguments will count as proper legal arguments, while others will not.  See, e.g., 
PAUL W. KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW: RECONSTRUCTING LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 43–45 
(1999) (“Legal decision-making differs from other kinds of policy formulation in just this way: it 
always begins from a set of sources that already have authority within the community’s past.  Legal 
arguments do not begin by asking about ‘the best outcome, all things considered.’ . . . We can 
imagine a policy science that is wholly unbounded by the past, but that is not law’s rule.”).  See 
also ELIZABETH MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW SCHOOL: LEARNING TO “THINK LIKE A 
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To think that competent judges can—or should—be perfectly agnostic 
about questions of law is unrealistic.  Most judges will have spent their 
professional careers thinking about legal questions, and they will have 
developed strong views about how many of those questions should be 
answered.  New judges (as Justice Rehnquist then was) necessarily 
approach legal issues in light of their prior experiences,6 and long-serving 
judges tend to be protective of their own prior decisions and theories.7  
 
LAWYER” 3–4 (2007) (“Some would associate thinking like a lawyer with superior analytical skills 
in a neutral sense; I would instead characterize the acquisition of lawyerly ‘thinking’ as an initiation 
into a particular linguistic and textual tradition found in our society.”); LLOYD L. WEINREB, LEGAL 
REASON: THE USE OF ANALOGY IN LEGAL ARGUMENT 4–5 (2005) (discussing the centrality of 
analogy to legal reasoning, but acknowledging the absence of rules “that prescribe how much or 
what sort of similarity is enough to sustain analogies generally or to sustain a particular analogy”). 
6. Scholars have long recognized that individual judges may reach different results in similar or 
identical cases.  See, e.g., Charles Grove Haines, General Observations on the Effects of Personal, 
Political, and Economic Influences in the Decisions of Judges, 17 ILL. L. REV. 96, 104–05, 116 
(1922) (suggesting that insufficient attention had previously been paid to the effect on adjudication 
of the life experiences of judges, and that judging represents an exercise in judgment “that carr[ies] 
us to the very roots of human nature and human conduct”).  See also FELIX FRANKFURTER, OF 
LAW AND LIFE AND OTHER THINGS THAT MATTER: PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FELIX 
FRANKFURTER, 1956–1963 59 (Philip B. Kurland ed., 1965) (“Since the litigation that comes 
before the Supreme Court is so largely entangled in public issues, the general outlook and juristic 
philosophy of the justices inevitably will influence their views and in doubtful cases will determine 
them.  That is saying something very different from the too prevalent notion that divisions on the 
Court run along party lines.”).  Indeed, we know that Presidents nominate judicial candidates 
(particularly Supreme Court Justices) precisely because they think that they know how their 
nominees will decide questions that the Presidents care about; advocacy groups of various stripes 
support or oppose nominees based on the groups’ predictions about how the nominees will vote on 
issues of concern to them; and members of the Senate attempt, albeit more effectively in some 
instances than in others, to find out how the Presidents’ nominees are likely to decide issues that 
the senators care about.  See, e.g., JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF 
THE SUPREME COURT 330–45 (2007) (detailing the campaign mounted by conservative groups 
against President George W. Bush’s nomination of White House Counsel Harriet Miers to fill the 
vacancy created by the retirement of Justice Sandra Day O’Connor); Vicki C. Jackson, Packages 
of Judicial Independence: The Selection and Tenure of Article III Judges, 95 GEO. L.J. 965, 977 
(2007) (“But, competence is not inconsistent with partisan affiliation or particular ideologies, 
considerations which have long played a role in the selection of nominees by Presidents and in the 
Senate’s willingness to confirm.”).  We also know that such predictions do not always turn out to 
be correct.  See, e.g., BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND HIS SUPREME 
COURT—A JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY 172–73, 326 (1983) (discussing President Eisenhower’s regret 
over his nominations of Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justice William J. Brennan, Jr.).  See also 
Presidents Sometimes Regret Justices They Appoint, USA TODAY (July 4, 2005, 8:29 PM), 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/2005-07-04-defiant-justices_x.htm (collecting 
names of Justices who allegedly disappointed the Presidents who nominated them). 
7. The profession (and sometimes, the public) properly esteems judges who have made a 
particular area of law their own.  See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher, Pragmatic Justice: The Contributions 
of Judge Harold Leventhal to Administrative Law, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 894, 894 (1980) (stating 
that Judge Leventhal “in less than fifteen years on the bench emerged as one of the Nation’s most 
respected appellate judges and a principal author of the modern law of administrative 
government”); Frank T. Read, The Penman of the Court: A Tribute to John Minor Wisdom, 60 TUL. 
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Judges also typically labor under the burden of heavy caseloads, which 
necessarily limits the amount of time they can devote to any particular 
case; the weight of those caseloads also undoubtedly reinforces a natural 
tendency not to reconsider what has previously been considered, and to 
try and fit new problems into old categories.8  On the other hand, open-
mindedness or impartiality is universally recognized as a critical 
component of judicial decision making.9 
 
L. REV. 264, 271 (1985) (“No judge in America contributed more to the evolution of school 
integration law than John Minor Wisdom.”); Margaret V. Sachs, Judge Friendly and the Law of 
Securities Regulation: The Creation of a Judicial Reputation, 50 SMU L. REV. 777, 780 (1997) 
(“Judge Friendly is said to have done ‘more to shape the law of securities regulation than any [other] 
judge in the country.’”).  As a judge’s jurisprudential commitments harden, however, it is possible 
that the judge may become less receptive to new or different ideas.  An advocate’s challenge may 
therefore become easier or more difficult, depending on which side of the judge’s predilections his 
or her case falls.  To appreciate the point, one need only consider the challenge that Solicitor 
General Erwin Griswold faced in the Pentagon Papers case, arguing for a nonabsolutist 
interpretation of the First Amendment to a bench that included Justice Hugo L. Black.  See 
Transcript of Proceedings at 75, New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (No. 
1873), http://www.nytimes.com/1971/06/27/archives/transcript-of-oral-argument-in-times-and-
post-cases-before-the.html?_r=0 (“Now Mr. Justice, your construction of [the First Amendment] is 
well-known, and I certainly respect it.  You say that no law means no law, and that should be 
obvious.  I can only say, Mr. Justice, that to me it is equally obvious that ‘no law’ does not mean 
‘no law,’ and I would seek to persuade the court that that is true.”); see also New York Times Co., 
403 U.S. at 717–18 (Black, J., concurring) (criticizing Griswold’s argument).  The problem may 
be less serious, of course, in multi-member courts, particularly where all of the judges are actively 
involved in the decision-making process.  In addition, some judges may be more temperamentally 
inclined than others to reconsider their views.  Finally, in addition to having strong views on 
substantive legal issues, some judges may have strong commitments to particular interpretive 
strategies.  See generally STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC 
CONSTITUTION (2005) (describing Justice Breyer’s interpretive theory); ANTONIN SCALIA, A 
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (1997) (describing Justice 
Scalia’s interpretive theory). 
8. More generally, Thomas Morawetz has argued that judges do not simply have different 
values, but “different ways of giving order to experience.”  Thomas S. Morawetz, The Epistemology 
of Judging: Wittgenstein and Deliberative Practice, 3 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 35, 57 (1990). 
What they share is mediated by language and the ways in which they differ are also 
reflected in language.  The issue is not, as some political philosophers say, that some 
favor liberty and others equality.  The issue is rather that the ways in which persons fit 
psychological, economic, political, social experiences together, the ways in which they 
make sense of their own lives and the lives of others, differ significantly and that hard 
questions of decision making fall prey to that diversity.  The fact that some are libertarian 
and others egalitarian is merely a symptom of this more encompassing and greater 
diversity. 
Id. at 57–58.  Nonetheless, Professor Morawetz rejects the view that judges are wholly 
unconstrained in their individual or collaborative deliberations, or that they are unable, because of 
those differing values and ways of ordering experience, to engage in genuine dialogue: “They are 
constrained individually by a particular way of addressing and understanding interpretive questions 
and they are constrained collectively by the fact that the shared practice embraces a limited range 
of ways of proceeding.  This limitation is mutually understood and recognized.”  Id. at 59. 
9. Impartiality is particularly important where legal questions are close ones and their resolution 
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All of this raises an important question that I would like to explore in 
this Essay: To what extent do we expect judges to have an open mind 
about difficult questions of law, or, at the very least, to be able to give a 
fair hearing to interpretations of law with which they might be 
predisposed to disagree?  Or, more generally, what do we expect of 
judges in their decision making? 
These are difficult questions to answer, particularly because of the 
great variety of judicial offices and functions.  In some respects, for 
example, what we expect of a Supreme Court Justice may be different 
from what we expect of family court judges.  But there are some 
requirements to which all judges should be held, albeit perhaps in 
different ways, to differing degrees, and with differing degrees of 
importance. 
One answer to these questions, therefore, is that we expect judges to 
listen, to listen carefully, and to take seriously what they hear.  By 
“listening,” we mean something more than the physical act of hearing.  
We mean to say that judges should engage the litigants’ arguments 
rigorously and respectfully, reflecting on the issues presented in a case as 
seriously as they would if their own interests were at stake.  Indeed, we 
expect more than that.  We expect a judge to try and see the parties’ 
dispute, not solely from the judge’s vantage point, but also from the 
perspectives of the parties and those of the individuals and institutions 
that may be affected by the judge’s decision.10 
 
depends on the spirit with which they are considered.  See, e.g., JAMES BOYD WHITE, HERACLES’ 
BOW: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE LAW 97 (1985) (“It is not a defect but a 
merit of our system that judges are acknowledged to have discretion, that legal questions are seen 
as open and difficult, that juries can decide within a wide range. . . . It is the aim of our law not to 
obliterate individual judicial judgments in favor of a scheme, but to structure and discipline them, 
to render them public and accountable.”); Stephen G. Breyer, Making Our Democracy Work: The 
Yale Lectures, 120 YALE L.J. 1999, 2013 (2011) (“[L]egal questions that reach the Supreme Court 
are difficult, uncertain, and close ones.”); Learned Hand, Sources of Tolerance, 79 U. PA. L. REV. 
1, 12 (1930) (“For in such matters [as constitutional interpretation] everything turns upon the spirit 
in which [the judge] approaches the questions before him.”).  Impartiality requires introspection 
and a commitment to the pursuit of self-knowledge on the part of the judge, who must try and come 
to terms with his or her biases, including those that are only implicit.  See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Rachlinski 
et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1221 
(2009) (“Our research supports three conclusions.  First, judges, like the rest of us, carry implicit 
biases concerning race.  Second, these implicit biases can affect judges’ judgment, at least in 
contexts where judges are unaware of a need to monitor their decisions for racial bias.  Third, and 
conversely, when judges are aware of a need to monitor their own responses for the influence of 
implicit racial biases, and are motivated to suppress that bias, they appear able to do so.”). 
10. See, e.g., TED COHEN, THINKING OF OTHERS: ON THE TALENT FOR METAPHOR 9 (2008) 
(“[U]nderstanding one another involves thinking of oneself as another, and thus the talent for doing 
this must be related to the talent of thinking of one thing as another; and it may be the same talent, 
differently employed.”).  See also id. at 13 (“Thinking of one person as another is a bemusing and 
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We also expect judges to try and learn as much as they reasonably can 
(within the limits imposed by their caseloads and the nature of the 
adversary system)11 about the particularities of the case they must decide.  
In this respect, we hope that judges will take their cue from Justice Louis 
D. Brandeis, rather than from Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, who 
observed that Justice Brandeis “always desire[d] to know all that can be 
known about a case whereas I am afraid that I wish[ed] to know as little 
as I [could] safely go on.”12  We want judges to respect the need for 
stability in the law, but also to be open, where appropriate, to the 
possibility that an earlier decision might not be controlling, that it might 
simply be wrong, or that the rule it articulated might have proved 
ineffective in practice and should therefore be modified or abandoned.13  
 
mysterious enterprise, but if I am right, the ability to do this is a fundamental human capacity 
without which our moral and aesthetic lives would scarcely be possible.”). 
11. See, e.g., Rowe v. Gibson, 798 F.3d 622, 639 (7th Cir. 2015) (Hamilton, J., dissenting) 
(“The foundation of our legal system is a confidence that the adversarial procedures will test shaky 
or questionable evidence.  ‘Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence and 
careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking 
shaky but admissible evidence.’” (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 586 
(1993))).  One of the issues involved in Rowe was the majority’s use of factual material gleaned 
from the Internet in reversing a summary judgment.  Id. at 628–31 (majority opinion).  See also 
Mitchell v. JCG Indus., Inc., 753 F.3d 695, 702–03 (7th Cir. 2014) (order denying petition for 
rehearing en banc, over the dissent of four judges, with respect to a panel decision in a “doffing-
and-donning” labor case that was based in part on a time-and-motion study conducted in the 
chambers of the writing judge); Mitchell v. JCG Indus., Inc., 745 F.3d 837, 843 (7th Cir. 2014) 
(Posner, J.) (holding that time spent donning and doffing mandatory protective gear was not 
compensable under federal labor laws, based in part on a time-and-motion study conducted in the 
chambers of a member of the appellate panel hearing the case).  Chief Judge Wood dissented from 
the panel opinion, taking issue, among other things, with the writing judge’s reliance on the in-
chambers time-and-motion study.  See id. at 846 (Wood, C.J., dissenting). 
12. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS: THE 
SUPREME COURT AT WORK 230 (1957) (quoting Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Felix 
Frankfurter (Dec. 3, 1925)).  See also Yosal Rogat, The Judge as Spectator, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 
213, 247 (1964) (“[Holmes] could rely on the comprehensive abstractions that he had long before 
worked out because he was not interested in the individual and particular aspects of a situation. . . 
. This ability to stand off and discern a few central and governing issues—to see ‘the same old 
donkey’—helps to explain not only the brevity of Holmes’ opinions, but also his quite remarkable 
speed in writing them.  (‘A case doesn’t generally take more than two days if it does that.’)  That 
facility was related to the way in which he was so far from Brandeis’ belief that ‘knowledge is 
essential to understanding; and understanding should precede judging.’”). 
13. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 471 U.S. 79, 98–99 (1986) (allowing challenges to racial 
discrimination in jury selection based on the use of peremptory challenges in a single case), 
overruling Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 227–28 (1965) (conditioning relief from racial 
discrimination in jury selection on proof of a pattern of discrimination); Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. 
Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 664 (1978) (determining that a municipal corporation was a “person” within 
the meaning of Section 1983), overruling Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 186–91 (1961) (holding 
that a municipal corporation was not a “person” within the meaning of the statute).  Justice White, 
the author of the majority opinion in Swain v. Alabama, explained his reasons for abandoning it in 
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We expect judges to press advocates to engage relevant arguments that 
may have been made poorly or not at all, rather than allowing the case to 
be decided by default—while also respecting the line that separates the 
judge’s role from that of the advocates and being mindful of the power 
that judges necessarily exercise over those they encounter in the 
courtroom.14  We also expect judges to be susceptible, within limits, to 
being persuaded by the advocates’ arguments, and, in the context of 
multi-member courts, by their colleagues’ views.  And we expect judges 
to focus, as they deliberate, on the particularities of the case at hand, 
 
Batson v. Kentucky.  See Batson, 471 U.S. at 100, 101 (White, J., concurring) (“The Court now 
rules that such use of peremptory challenges in a given case may, but does not necessarily, raise an 
inference [of discrimination], which the prosecutor carries the burden of refuting. . . . I agree that, 
to this extent, Swain should be overruled.  [Swain should have put prosecutors on notice] that using 
peremptories to exclude blacks on the assumption that no black juror could fairly judge a black 
defendant would violate the Equal Protection Clause.  It appears, however, that the practice of 
peremptorily eliminating blacks from petit juries remains widespread, so much so that I agree that 
an opportunity to inquire should be afforded when this occurs.”).  A classic example of the Court 
repudiating an earlier interpretation of the Constitution as simply wrong is West Virginia State 
Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (holding that public school officials 
violated the free speech clause of the First Amendment by requiring students to salute the flag and 
say the Pledge of Allegiance), overruling Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 309 U.S. 586, 598–
600 (1940) (holding that state officials could require public school students to say the Pledge of 
Allegiance and salute the flag, notwithstanding their religious beliefs). 
14. There are limits, of course, to the extent to which judges may properly take it upon 
themselves to re-cast the issues presented in a case, particularly where the record has been set in a 
lower court and the reviewing court’s scope of review is limited to questions that have been 
properly presented and accepted for review.  See, e.g., Margaret L. Moses, Beyond Judicial 
Activism: When the Supreme Court Is No Longer a Court, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 161, 162–64 
(2011) (arguing that the Supreme Court exceeds its constitutional limits when it treats “cases simply 
as vehicles for changing the law in a way that a majority of the Court [feels] desirable” and 
“decide[s] issues that were not based on a record below, had not been the subject of decisions by 
lower courts, and sometimes had not even been briefed by parties or amici”).  See generally Barry 
Sullivan & Megan Canty, Interruptions in Search of a Purpose: Oral Argument in the Supreme 
Court, October Terms 1958–1960 and 2010–2012, 2015 UTAH L. REV. 1005, 1071–79 
(summarizing empirical data and noting the apparently increased dominance of the Justices at oral 
argument).  In addition, judges always stand in position of great power with respect to the lawyers 
and litigants whose cases they decide.  See id. at 1032–33 (“Tough questions are an essential part 
of oral argument, and most judges do not abuse their position.  But the relationship of judge and 
counsel is not one of equality; sarcasm, rudeness, sharp questioning, and other aggressive judicial 
tactics can easily become an abuse of the power relationship that necessarily exists in any 
courtroom.  That potential for abuse is enhanced when a Justice openly disrespects a party or her 
counsel or adopts an explicitly adversarial posture toward one side or the other.”).  Justice William 
J. Brennan, Jr., once wrote that his way of reading the Constitution differed from other people’s 
ways of reading other texts because “consequences flow from a Justice’s interpretation in a direct 
and immediate way.”  William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary 
Ratification, 27 S. TEX L. REV. 433, 434 (1986).  A Justice’s interpretation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, for example, is “not a contemplative exercise in defining the shape of a just society,” 
but “an order—supported by the full coercive power of the State—that the present society change 
in a fundamental aspect.”  Id. 
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rather than relying on generalities they may have worked out to own their 
satisfaction many years before. 
On this view, in other words, we expect a great deal from judges: we 
expect them to engage their cases in a way that risks a genuine encounter, 
not only with the relevant text and existing jurisprudence, but also with 
other human beings, their situations, their problems, and their ideas.  
Heavy caseloads and time constraints may make it difficult for judges to 
meet those expectations.  So, too, may the human mind’s apparently 
natural inclination to make quick judgments; to try and fit things that are 
new or unfamiliar into existing patterns, regardless of how well they 
actually fit; and to give effect to biases that may be unknown even to the 
person who harbors them.15  These factors present challenges that require 
a significant amount of judicial circumspection and self-awareness.16  
Judges may never free themselves completely from their biases, 
particularly those that are unconscious, but we expect them to try and 
 
15. See generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011) (describing 
“System 1,” as the fast, intuitive way humans think and discussing the situations in which 
individuals should and should not trust their intuitions or “fast thinking”); Mark W. Bennett, 
Confronting Cognitive “Anchoring Effect” and “Blind Spot” Biases in Federal Sentencing: A 
Modest Solution for Reforming a Fundamental Flaw, 104 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 489 (2014) 
(analyzing the “anchoring effect,” a cognitive shortcut that may lead to errors in judgment, in 
judicial decision making, including sentencing decisions); Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial 
Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777 (2001) (explaining that judges may be vulnerable to cognitive 
illusions that have significant impacts on judicial decision making); Charles W. Murdock & Barry 
Sullivan, What Kahneman Means for Lawyers: Some Reflections on Thinking, Fast and Slow, 44 
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1377 (2013) (emphasizing the importance to legal practice of distinguishing 
between fast and slow thinking and recognizing the inability of human beings to act solely on the 
basis of reason); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 
84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195 (2009) (finding that judges, much like the general population, harbor 
implicit biases concerning black Americans that may influence judicial decision making).  See also 
Michael B. Hyman, Implicit Bias in the Courts, 102 ILL. B.J. 40, 47 (2014) (“Implicit biases stir 
within all of us.  In our role as lawyers and judges we must be conscious of implicit bias’ hold on 
us.  Indeed, unless we self-assess our underlying assumptions and attitudes, implicit biases can and 
will lead us to actions and decisions we otherwise might not have undertaken.”). 
16. Another important factor, of course, is the quality of lawyering that is brought to bear on a 
particular case.  Although the significance of that factor must be left for another day, it bears noting 
that there are significant shortcomings in the “umpireal” metaphor that has been used to describe 
the judge’s role, particularly in cases in which one party is not represented by counsel, one party is 
represented by incompetent counsel, or the strength of the judge’s known or perceived biases have 
caused certain arguments not to be made.  While judges must be careful not to “take over” a case, 
they should push lawyers to address relevant arguments that have been made poorly or not at all.  
See supra text accompanying note 14 (“We expect judges to press advocates to engage relevant 
arguments that may have been made poorly or not at all, rather than allowing the case to be decided 
by default—while also respecting the line that separates the judge’s role from that of the advocates 
and being mindful of the power that judges necessarily exercise over those they encounter in the 
courtroom.”). 
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recognize those biases and to be mindful of them.17 
There is another view, however, that holds that such expectations are 
not only difficult or impossible for judges to meet, but largely 
unnecessary—and even undesirable.  On that view, deliberation—
whether the internal deliberation of a single judge or the give-and-take of 
a judicial panel—has little value.  If one has a firm view of the world and 
how it works, one need learn little about either the particularities of a case 
or the views that others have of it before coming to a conclusion about 
how the case should be decided.  That seems to have been the view 
expressed by Justice Holmes when he wrote that he, unlike Justice 
Brandeis, “wish[ed] to know as little [about a case] as [he could] safely 
go on.”  Similarly, Judge Richard Posner has suggested that a judge’s 
difficulty in making up his or her mind should be viewed as “a 
psychological trait rather than an index of conscientiousness.”18  On that 
view, for example, the purpose of a post-argument conference of a multi-
member court is not for the judges to exchange views, or to attempt to 
persuade each other, but simply to tally the votes and confirm the 
 
17. See Morawetz, supra note 8, at 58 (noting that judges cannot choose the perspective from 
which they will decide a case, but participation in a practice is “subject to reflection and conditioned 
by learning”). 
18. RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 299 (2008).  Judge Posner has described his own 
approach: 
My approach to judging is not to worry initially about doctrine, precedent and all that 
stuff, but instead, try to figure out, what is the sensible solution to this problem, and then 
having found what I think is a sensible solution, without worrying about doctrinal details, 
I ask ‘is this blocked by some kind of authoritative precedent of the Supreme Court’?  If 
it is not blocked, I say fine, let’s go with the common sense, sensical [sic] solution. 
See Josh Blackman, Judge Posner on Judging, Birthright Citizenship, and Precedent, JOSH 
BLACKMAN’S BLOG (Nov. 6, 2015), www.joshblackman.com/blog/2015/11/06/judge-posner-on-
judging-birthright-citizenship-and-precedent/ (discussing Judge Posner’s approach to judging). 
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outcome.19  It is the vote that matters, not the reasons or the explanation.20  
Along the same lines, Judge Posner has suggested that judges can be 
expected to make short work of opinion writing: a good first draft of a 
Supreme Court opinion should take no more than four hours.21  That 
argument suggests that there is little room for persuasion: the arguments 
of counsel and the reflections of one’s fellow judges seem largely beside 
the point, and so does much of the adversary process itself. 
The argument of this Essay is that we should prefer the first view of 
judging, however imperfect its actualization may be.  We should expect 
judges to listen, and to listen in a particular kind of way, that is, by 
encountering the issues presented in their cases seriously and 
authentically.  We should expect judges to approach their cases not 
merely as intellectual puzzles to be solved (although the choice among 
 
19. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 308–09 (Harvard 
Univ. Press rev. ed. 1999).  Post-argument conferences tend to be perfunctory, according to Judge 
Posner, because, where there is disagreement, “the principal effect of arguing is . . . to drive the 
antagonists farther apart—or at least to cause them to dig in their heels.”  POSNER, supra note 18, 
at 302.  But see Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and Decision Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84 VA. 
L. REV. 1335, 1360 (1998) (“[W]e do spend a great deal of time listening to each other’s views and 
considering arguments each of us makes.  This dynamic process of discussion and dialogue is what 
I have in mind when I speak of collegial deliberation.”).  In recent years, the Supreme Court seems 
to have adopted a conference model that places less emphasis on the process of persuasion.  See, 
e.g., THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE (1940–1985): THE PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS BEHIND 
NEARLY 300 SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 117 (Del Dickson ed., 2001) (“The nature of the 
conference continued to evolve under Burger’s leadership.  The Justices became less interested in 
using the conference to exchange ideas, debate, or persuade others.  Instead, they began to view the 
conference merely as an opportunity to declare their individual positions and count votes.”).  See 
also Sullivan & Canty, supra note 14, at 1028 (“The contemporary conference is thought to have 
become very formally structured, with little, if any, give-and-take; the Justices do not interrupt each 
other or talk out of turn.”). 
20. See Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize?  (The Same Thing 
Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 19 (1994) (“There is also the intrinsic pleasure of 
writing, for those who like to write, and of exercising and displaying analytical prowess or other 
intellectual gifts, for those who have them and want to use them.  But I ignore these and other 
sources of satisfaction in the work of a judge as adding little of analytical significance to voting.  
Also, they are not important to most judges, who are happy to cede opinion-writing to eager law 
clerks, believing (consistent with my analysis) that the core judicial function is deciding, that is, 
voting, rather than articulating the grounds of decision.”).  See also POSNER, supra note 18, at 110 
(“The judicial opinion can best be understood as an attempt to explain how the decision, even if (as 
most likely) arrived at on the basis of intuition, could have been arrived at on the basis of logical, 
step-by-step reasoning.”). 
21. RICHARD A. POSNER, REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING 246 (2013) (stating that Justice 
Ginsburg’s “claim not to have enough time to write opinions puzzles me given how few opinions 
Supreme Court Justices write . . . . [They write] an average of sixteen per term.  Suppose it would 
take her four hours to write the first draft of an opinion, on average.  That may be a generous 
estimate.  Supreme Court opinions don’t have to be long, since the Court usually grants certiorari 
to decide only one or two issues and doesn’t have to worry about lower-court case law . . . . Four 
hours of drafting each of sixteen opinions would add up to sixty-four hours a year”). 
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possible readings of a relevant text may well be puzzling), but as real 
disputes involving real people with competing interests, ideas, and 
concerns that are important to them and deserving of the judge’s respect 
and attention.  We should not count a judge’s inclination toward 
deliberation in a difficult case as a shortcoming or character flaw.  We 
take this view, not because we think that it will necessarily guarantee 
better results (although we expect that it will), but because we believe 
that judging as a human activity requires it. 
This Essay will make that argument by offering a close reading of two 
novels concerned with the lives and work of judges, namely, Ian 
McEwan’s The Children Act22 and Colm Tóibín’s The Heather Blazing.23 
Part I of the Essay briefly considers the meaning and significance of 
the “equal hearing” principle, emphasizing, in particular, that the 
principle is concerned not only with equality of access, but also with the 
quality of access, that is, with the nature and substance of “the hearing” 
itself.  In turn, the quality of the hearing depends not only on compliance 
with certain forms, but, and at least equally important, on the attitudes of 
the judges and their openness to hearing arguments with which they 
might be inclined to disagree or predisposed to reject.  The “equal 
hearing” principle can therefore be thought to entail a “hearing” in the 
fullest sense—that is, paying attention to the parties’ arguments, learning 
as much as possible about the case, deliberating about the case, and giving 
a reasoned explanation for the result. 
Part II aims to achieve a deeper appreciation of the “equal hearing” 
principle through a close reading of two novels that are deeply concerned 
with the inner lives of judges, the moral complexity of difficult cases, and 
the factors that influence the decision of cases.  The decisional processes 
described in these two books are not offered as ideal types and the judges 
portrayed in the books are not perfect.  By and large, however, these 
fictional judges take seriously the difficult questions they are required to 
decide; they puzzle over them; and they sometimes cannot “leave [them] 
alone,”24 even after a judgment has been rendered.  These judges 
sometimes think—correctly or not—that they could have done better.25  
 
22. IAN MCEWAN, THE CHILDREN ACT (2014). 
23. COLM TÓIBÍN, THE HEATHER BLAZING (rev. ed. 2012).  Tóibín originally published the 
novel in 1992; the 2012 version contains a revised chapter and an afterword explaining the revision.  
See infra note 190. 
24. MCEWAN, supra note 22, at 29. 
25. Billy Budd, Herman Melville’s short novel set in the year of the “Great Mutiny,” may also 
shed some light on the haunting power of the recognition that one might have done better.  See 
HERMAN MELVILLE, BILLY BUDD AND THE PIAZZA TALES 11 (Dolphin Books ed., 1962).  
Following the sailor Billy Budd’s accidental killing of John Claggart, the villainous master-at-arms, 
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In that sense, these judges embody what most of us at least hope that 
judging entails: that judges do struggle with decisions in hard cases, and 
that a judge’s inability to come to a quick decision in a difficult case is 
indeed a matter of conscientiousness, or, at least, the necessary condition 
of humanity, rather than a mere “psychological trait” or character flaw. 
Finally, Part III briefly revisits the subject of adjudication and the equal 
hearing principle in light of the two novels and emphasizes once more the 
idea of “listening” as an essential aspect of judging, inviting further 
research and reflection. 
I.  THE EQUAL HEARING PRINCIPLE 
In Justice Is Conflict, the philosopher Stuart Hampshire argues: 
No one is expected to believe that [the Supreme Court’s] decisions are 
infallibly just in matters of substance; but everybody is expected to 
believe that at least its procedures are just [in the sense that] they 
conform to the basic principle governing adversary reasoning: that both 
sides should be equally heard.26 
The importance of the principle that “both sides should be equally 
heard”—the “equal hearing principle”—to the proper functioning of the 
Supreme Court seems too obvious to warrant discussion.  After all, the 
Supreme Court does not simply resolve disputes of great practical 
 
Captain Vere, the ship’s commanding officer, convenes a “drum-head” court to try Billy Budd for 
the killing.  Id. at 71.  Seeing fit to intervene in the court’s deliberations, Vere makes several 
arguments aimed at stiffening the judges’ resolve and dissuading them from showing mercy to the 
defendant.  In one line of argument, he admonishes them: “For that law and the rigor of it, we are 
not responsible for it.  Our vowed responsibility is in this: That however pitilessly that law may 
operate, we nevertheless adhere to it and administer it.”  Id. at 77.  Later, he concludes his 
intervention with this argument: 
Your clement sentence [the crew] would account pusillanimous.  They would think that 
we flinch, that we are afraid of them—afraid of practicing a lawful rigor singularly 
demanded at this juncture lest it should provoke new troubles. . . . But I beseech you, my 
friends, do not take me amiss.  I feel as you do for this unfortunate boy.  But did he know 
our hearts, I take him to be of that generous nature that he would feel even for us on 
whom in this military necessity so heavy a compulsion is laid. 
Id. at 79.  Once Billy Budd has been condemned, however, and Vere has communicated his fate to 
him, Vere’s face is described as “one expressive of the agony of the strong,” reflecting that “the 
condemned one suffered less than he who mainly had effected the condemnation.”  Id.  Later, when 
Vere is dying from wounds suffered in battle, his thoughts once more turn to Billy Budd, whose 
name he is heard to murmur.  Id. at 95.  In writing Billy Budd, Melville seems to have been inspired 
in part by a true story of the American navy.  See generally BUCKNER F. MELTON, JR., A HANGING 
OFFENSE: THE STRANGE AFFAIR OF THE WARSHIP SOMERS (2003) (describing naval incidents that 
may have inspired Melville to write Billy Budd); HERSHEL PARKER, HERMAN MELVILLE: A 
BIOGRAPHY, VOLUME I, 1819–1851 (1996) (same). 
26. STUART HAMPSHIRE, JUSTICE IS CONFLICT 95 (2000).  See also Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 
443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“We are not final because we are infallible, but we are 
infallible only because we are final.”). 
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significance to the parties involved; the Court almost always articulates 
important principles of federal constitutional or statutory law in the 
course of resolving such disputes.27  Among other things, the Court gives 
clarity and substance to a constitutional text that was not only written in 
a different age, but written in terms that were sometimes—and perhaps 
intentionally—left quite vague and open to interpretation.28  More often, 
 
27. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (noting that “it is emphatically the 
province of the judiciary to say what the law is”).  But see United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 
2675, 2699 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[D]eclaring the compatibility of state or federal laws 
with the Constitution is not only not the ‘primary role’ of this Court, it is not a separate, free-
standing role at all.  We perform that role incidentally—by accident, as it were—when that is 
necessary to resolve the dispute before us.  Then, and only then, does it become ‘the province and 
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.’”); Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 
U.S. 288, 341 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“Considerations of propriety, as well as long-
established practice, demand that we refrain from passing upon the constitutionality of an act of 
Congress unless obliged to do so in the proper performance of our judicial function, when the 
question is raised by a party whose interests entitle him to raise it.”) (quoting Blair v. United States, 
250 U.S. 273, 279 (1919)).  Of course, the modern Supreme Court does not normally grant review 
simply to resolve a dispute between two parties.  The Supreme Court mainly grants review to decide 
important questions of federal law that have not been resolved in a satisfactory or uniform way by 
the lower state and federal courts.  See SUP. CT. R. 10 (describing the factors that normally guide 
the Court’s discretion in deciding whether to grant review).  Occasionally, when one or more 
Justices is disqualified (or when one or more vacancies exist), the Court may decide a case by 
equally divided vote, in which case the Court writes no opinion and the decision below stands, but 
without precedential value except in the jurisdiction from which the case originated.  See Durant v. 
Essex Co., 74 U.S. 107, 110 (1868) (“No affirmative action can be had in a case where the judges 
are equally divided in opinion as to the judgment to be rendered or the order to be made.”); EUGENE 
GRESSMAN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 6 (9th ed. 2007). 
28. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 236 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (“All new 
laws [including constitutions], though penned with the greatest technical skill, and passed on the 
fullest and most mature deliberation, are considered as more or less obscure and equivocal, until 
their meaning be liquidated and ascertained by a series of particular discussions and 
adjudications.”).  See also Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949) (Frankfurter, J.) (“Due process 
of law thus conveys neither formal nor fixed nor narrow requirements.  It is the compendious 
expression for all those rights that the courts must enforce because they are basic to our free society.  
But basic rights do not become petrified as of any one time, even though, as a matter of human 
experience, some may not too rhetorically be called eternal verities. . . . The real clue to the problem 
confronting the judiciary in the application of the Due Process Clause is not to ask where the line 
is once and for all to be drawn, but to recognize that it is for the Court to draw it by the gradual and 
empiric process of ‘inclusion and exclusion.’”), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); 
Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co. of D.C. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., Inc., 347 U.S. 582, 646–47 (1949) 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“The precision which characterizes these portions of Article III is in 
striking contrast to the imprecision of so many other provisions of the Constitution dealing with 
other very vital aspects of government.  This was not due to chance or ineptitude on the part of the 
Framers . . . . Great concepts like ‘Commerce . . . among the several States,’ ‘due process of law,’ 
‘liberty,’ ‘property’ were purposely left to gather meaning from experience.  For they relate to the 
whole domain of social and economic fact, and the statesmen who founded this Nation knew too 
well that only a stagnant society remains unchanged.”); W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 
624, 639 (1943) (Jackson, J.) (“[T]he the task of translating the majestic generalities of the Bill of 
Rights, conceived as part of the pattern of liberal government in the eighteenth century, into 
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the Court is asked to determine the proper interpretation or application of 
a statute or the legitimacy of an administrative regulation.29  In either 
case, the effects of the Court’s decisions are likely to be far reaching.  The 
“equal hearing” principle is obviously important to the parties whose 
interests are directly involved in a Supreme Court case; it is essential that 
they should have confidence in the impartiality of the Court’s procedures.  
But the “equal hearing” principle is also important to the proper 
resolution of the significant questions of law and policy that are typically 
presented in Supreme Court cases, and, ultimately, to the maintenance of 
public confidence in the judicial process. 
Although Professor Hampshire was speaking specifically about the 
Supreme Court in Justice Is Conflict, his claim is necessarily broader and 
more comprehensive.30  Indeed, the “equal hearing” principle might well 
be considered definitional with respect to the nature of adjudication in 
any liberal democracy.31  Whatever else might be said, we expect that 
courts will be fair in some general sense, that is, that the courts will be 
independent from the other branches of government, for example, and 
that they will administer the law impartially, doing justice without regard 
to the litigants’ wealth or status, political beliefs or affiliations, creed or 
color, gender or sexual orientation.  But we also expect the courts’ 
proceedings to be fair in the very specific sense of conforming to the 
ancient maxim “audi alteram partem” (hear the other side) when deciding 
 
concrete restraints on officials dealing with the problems of the twentieth century, is one to disturb 
self-confidence.”). 
29. See ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES 3 (2014) (“Indeed, a substantial majority 
of the Supreme Court’s caseload involves statutory construction (nearly two-thirds of its recent 
docket by one estimate).”). 
30. See supra text accompanying note 26. 
31. Indeed, there may be some criteria that are essential to any system of law, regardless of the 
nature of the regime.  In his famous recounting of the hypothetical king, “Rex’s bungling career as 
legislator and judge,” Lon L. Fuller identifies eight ways in which Rex’s “attempt to create and 
maintain a system of legal rules [has] miscarr[ied].”  LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 38–
39 (rev. ed. 1969).  The hypothetical Rex managed to discover and pursue “eight distinct routes to 
disaster.”  Id. at 39.  The first, according to Professor Fuller, was Rex’s “failure to achieve rules at 
all, so that every issue must be decided on an ad hoc basis.”  Id.  “The other routes are: (2) a failure 
to publicize, or at least make available to the affected party, the rules he is expected to observe; (3) 
the abuse of retroactive legislation, which not only cannot itself guide action, but undercuts the 
integrity of rules prospective in effect, since it puts them under the threat of retrospective change; 
(4) a failure to make rules understandable; (5) the enactment of contradictory rules or (6) rules that 
require conduct beyond the powers of the affected party; (7) introducing such frequent changes in 
the rules that the subject cannot orient his action by them; and, finally, (8) a failure of congruence 
between the rules as announced and their actual administration.”  Id.  Professor Fuller concludes: 
“A total failure in any one of these eight directions does not simply result in a bad system of law; 
it results in something that is not properly called a legal system at all, except perhaps in the 
Pickwickian sense in which a void contract can still be said to be one kind of contract.”  Id. 
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the “unavoidable and disputable issues”32 that courts often are called on 
to decide.  It is in this way, Professor Hampshire explains, that “justice is 
to be done and seen to be done.”33 
When we talk about the “equal hearing” principle, we are likely to 
emphasize its equality component: justice requires that both sides be 
treated equally.  But that is not the only requirement—or the full 
meaning—of the “equal hearing” principle.  The principle necessarily has 
two parts: one requires “equality” of treatment, as we have seen; the other 
requires a particular kind of treatment—a “hearing.” 
In the common law or Anglo-American legal tradition, the “hearing” 
requirement has a relatively specific meaning or connotation.  Among 
other things, the parties must be afforded access to the tribunal; and the 
tribunal must be able to hear directly from those with the most intimate 
knowledge of the controversy and the most direct stake in the outcome.  
It is the parties’ understandings of the dispute and their arguments about 
it that matter.  Thus, denying a “hearing” to both sides might satisfy the 
requirement of equality, but it cannot satisfy the access—or hearing—
component of the “equal hearing” principle.34  Suppose, for example, that 
a tribunal were to adopt a bureaucratic, non-adversary procedure for 
deciding disputes without hearing directly from either side, either in 
person or in writing.  What the tribunal would hear in that event is not 
two competing narratives by the parties most intimately involved and 
interested in the dispute, but “One Big Story authorized by a state 
official,”35 as Robert P. Burns nicely puts it.  In such circumstances, the 
procedure might be fair in the sense of treating both sides equally, and 
the tribunal might even render decisions that were considered 
substantively fair and impartial.  But, from the standpoint of the common 
law tradition, the process would necessarily fall short.  Even if the result 
 
32. HAMPSHIRE, supra note 26, at 8.  Professor Hampshire notes the existence in society of 
various institutions for the resolution of conflicts, and their varying conceptions of fairness: 
“Fairness in advocacy is different from fairness in adjudication; fairness in parliament and in party 
politics is different from fairness in a law court and in an arbitration.”  Id. at 54–55. 
33. Id. at 9.  See also R v. Sussex Justices, Ex parte McCarthy, [1924] 1 KB 256, 259 (“[J]ustice 
should not only be done, but should be manifestly and undoubtedly seen to be done.”). 
34. But see EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE, AND ON THE 
PROCEEDINGS IN CERTAIN SOCIETIES IN LONDON RELATIVE TO THAT EVENT 258 (Conor Cruise 
O’Brien ed., Penguin Books 1986) (1790) (“Equal neglect is not impartial kindness.”). 
35. See ROBERT P. BURNS, A THEORY OF THE TRIAL 165 (1999) (comparing “the two-story 
structure of opening statement” with the “One Big Story authorized by a state official”).  See also 
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42–50 (2004) (Scalia, J. dissenting) (discussing the 
importance of public trials and the right of confrontation in the Anglo-American system of criminal 
justice).  See id. at 43 (“The common-law tradition is one of live testimony in court subject to 
adversarial testing, while the civil law condones examination in private by judicial officers.”). 
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were thought well reasoned, as well as fair and impartial, we would 
consider it procedurally flawed or mistaken. 
Thus, the “equal hearing” principle requires that each side be afforded 
“a hearing.”  Each side must be given the opportunity to present its 
evidence and make its arguments.  In this sense, each side must be heard.  
Each side must be listened to. 
To say that the “equal hearing” principle requires that both sides “be 
listened to” comes closer to the heart of the matter.  That expression, after 
all, may be taken to suggest that the quality, as well as the existence, of a 
“hearing” is critical.  The “hearing”—by which we mean the judge’s 
overall interaction with the case, including his or her interaction with the 
facts and the law, the parties and counsel, and, if relevant, fellow 
judges—must be a real one.  It must be genuine and authentic.  It is not 
enough that the parties be given “some kind of hearing”36 in a formal 
sense; the parties’ arguments must be “listened to”—that is, they must be 
seriously considered and carefully weighed.  In other words, in addition 
to requiring that a tribunal afford the parties an opportunity to present 
their respective narratives, the “equal hearing” principle requires that the 
tribunal authentically engage the merits of those narratives, not only at 
the time of the live hearing (if one is provided), but throughout the 
adjudicatory process.37 
What this entails, at least in part, perhaps, is the judge’s internalization 
of the adversarial perspective.  Successful advocates cannot afford to be 
blinded by the brilliance of their own arguments, but must always be 
vigilant as to both the weaknesses of their arguments and the strengths of 
the best arguments on the other side.  Only then can an advocate plan any 
reasonably promising strategy for winning the case.  As Professor 
 
36. See generally Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975) 
(describing due process hearing requirements). 
37. Some judges have had the practice of allowing oral argument, but then reading a written 
opinion granting judgment to one side or the other at the conclusion of the argument.  It may be 
that the judge was listening attentively to the argument and would not have delivered the opinion, 
as written, if anything had been said to change his or her mind.  It seems more likely, however, that 
the oral argument in such circumstances was simply an empty form and that nothing that could 
have been said at oral argument would have changed the judge’s mind.  In other circumstances, the 
problem may be that the judge’s clerk has only skimmed the briefs before finding a case that seems 
to resolve the question presented and drafting an opinion that merely regurgitates the earlier 
opinion, without seriously engaging the possible differences between the two situations.  
Alternatively, a judge might listen to both sides equally in an effort to grasp the nature of the 
problem to be solved, and then simply decide the case according to his or her own lights, without 
listening to anything else that the parties might wish to say.  The parties in these cases would have 
been treated equally, but in no sense would their positions have been afforded the kind of “serious 
consideration” contemplated by the “equal hearing” principle. 
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Hampshire suggests, “[d]iscussions in the inner forum of an individual 
mind naturally duplicate in form and structure the public adversarial 
discussions.”38  When an individual is confronted by “the ever-recurring 
cases of conflict of principles, adversary argument and then a kind of 
inner judicial discretion and adjudication are called for.”39  Just as a 
competent advocate will be able to grasp the strengths and weaknesses 
on both sides of an argument, so too must a conscientious judge.  At the 
very least, the “equal hearing” principle requires a serious and engaged 
inquiry into the facts of the case and the merits of the parties’ legal 
arguments. 
From this perspective, it also seems clear that the “equal hearing” 
principle is not simply a necessary structural element in a system of 
adjudication, but a normative requirement that constitutes part of the 
professional and moral obligation of judges.  In this sense, the “equal 
hearing” principle necessarily subsumes an array of requirements, 
including the requirement that judges (unlike most public officials) give 
reasons for the conclusions they reach.  Thus, as James Boyd White 
writes in Heracles’ Bow, “the hearing is the heart of the law, . . . but the 
hearing reaches its fullest significance only where it is coupled with the 
obligation to explain.”40  As Professor White explains: 
What we should demand in each case is that the judge give to the case 
attention of a certain sort and make it plain in writing that he or she has 
done so, for there, in the attention itself, is where justice resides.  We 
are entitled not to “like results” but to “like process” (or “due process”), 
and this means attention to the full merits of a case, including to what 
can fairly be said on both sides: to the fair-minded comprehension of 
contraries, to the recognition of the value of each person, to a sense of 
the limits of mind and language.41 
 
38. HAMPSHIRE, supra note 26, at 8. 
39. Id.  Those who are successful in argument, Professor Hampshire suggests, will have 
developed the “habit of balanced adversary thinking”—an ability to anticipate and answer the best 
arguments for the other side.  Id. at 9. 
40. WHITE, supra note 9, at 241. 
41. Id. at 133–34.  As Professor White has noted, this view of judging is “profoundly anti-
bureaucratic.”  Id. at 123.  See also id. at 123–24 (“It rejects the idea, for example, that the judge 
can properly make himself (or herself) merely an analyzer of costs and benefits, or merely a voice 
of authority, or merely a comparer of one case with another, or merely a policy-maker or problem-
solver.  The judge is always a person deciding a case the story of which can be characterized in a 
rich range of ways; and he (or she) is always responsible for his choice of characterization and for 
his decision.  He is always responsible as a composer for the composition that he makes.  One great 
vice of theory in the law is that it disguises the true power that the judge actually has, which it is 
his true task to exercise and to justify, under a pretense that the result is compelled by one or another 
intellectual system.  Our way of reading takes aim at those pretenses, and seeks to destroy them, by 
defining the work of the law as the work of individual minds, for which individuals are themselves 
responsible.”). 
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What Professor White has said of lawyers and judges generally is 
particularly true with respect to judges: 
[W]hen we evaluate an opinion or an argument, or the work of a judge 
or a lawyer, we normally do not speak merely in terms of analytical 
acuteness, skill in presentation, and intellectual coherence—though 
these are of course important qualities—but in much more general 
terms: openness to other ways of thinking; responsiveness to questions; 
honesty in facing difficulties; sensitivity to historical and social context; 
understanding of the situations and motives of others; awareness of the 
real costs and dangers of a particular decision; the capacity to make 
sense of the case as a whole, both standing alone and in connection with 
other cases.  Beyond such things, we speak of even more general 
qualities: courage, for example, and wisdom, and a sense of justice, and 
good judgment.  The legal intelligence in its ideal form would comprise 
nearly every intellectual, psychological, and moral virtue, and these 
qualities, when they are present, will manifest themselves in speech and 
writing.42 
H. Jefferson Powell has made a similar point, specifically with respect 
to the work of the Supreme Court: 
The Court plays its part in the system only when its members make it 
clear through their words that they are genuinely engaged with the hard 
issues before them, and that they are being honest with themselves and 
with us about the considerations that drive them.  Only when their 
opinions seek to persuade our judgments, not just coerce our wills, can 
the decisions of the Court truly be called authoritative.43 
This view of judging rejects the idea of the judge as a superior form of 
intelligence, delivering wisdom from on high.  The judge should not be 
seen as the genius who “prepare[s] small diamonds for people of limited 
intellectual means,”44 as Justice Holmes once described himself, or as the 
 
42. JAMES BOYD WHITE, LIVING SPEECH: RESISTING THE EMPIRE OF FORCE 212 (2006). 
43. H. JEFFERSON POWELL, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSCIENCE: THE MORAL DIMENSION OF 
JUDICIAL DECISION 108–09 (2008).  See also id. at 119–20 (“Under our practices, by an 
understanding dating back to the first years of the Republic, this means that questions of 
constitutional meaning are questions of law, to be resolved through the forms of legal argument.  
As we have seen, the constitutional virtues are necessary to make this possible in the face of the 
Constitution’s ambiguities and the inevitable presence of questions of degree in difficult cases.  
Any morally responsible involvement in the constitutional enterprise thus demands the 
constitutional virtue of faith as I have described it: confidence that it is possible to make sense of 
what we must do to interpret the Constitution as law, and a commitment to do what is required.  In 
addition, and critically, the virtues bring the decisions of the justices and other officials within the 
scope of informed criticism by the political community at large.”). 
44. HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND SIR 
FREDERICK POLLOCK, 1874–1932 173 (Mark De Wolfe Howe ed., 1941) (Letter from Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, Jr., to Sir Frederick Pollock (Dec. 1, 1925)).  Justice Holmes’s well-known 
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member of some exalted fraternity of alchemists who transform “the 
sordid controversies of litigants” into “great and shining truths,” as 
Justice Cardozo put it.45  Those views of the judicial role do not reflect 
the attitude that we expect judges in a democratic society to show toward 
their work, or toward the problems and concerns of those they serve. 
As Professor White has argued, the judge, like all legal actors, “is never 
merely a center of discretionary power; he or she is always, at least in 
form, a servant, or a trustee.”46  Professor White’s choice of the word 
“trustee” is particularly interesting.  A trustee is a fiduciary, of course, 
and we expect fiduciaries to take the matters with which they are 
entrusted as seriously as their own.  Thus, to refer to the judge as a 
“trustee” is to assume a high level of caring and commitment, both to the 
law and to the cases that come before the judge.  It is to assume that the 
judge will give the same level of attention to a case that he or she would 
give to it if the judge’s own life, liberty, or property were at stake.  In 
addition, of course, the judge must try, to the best of his or her ability, to 
appreciate the significance of the case from the parties’ perspectives, 
which may well be different from the judge’s own perspective.  The judge 
 
preference for judicial restraint was not the product of any belief in the efficacy of democratic 
government.  His early “loath[ing] [for] the thick-fingered clowns we call the people – especially 
as the beasts are represented at the political centers – vulgar, selfish, and base” appears to reflect a 
persistent attitude.  See TOUCHED WITH FIRE: CIVIL WAR LETTERS AND DIARY OF OLIVER 
WENDELL HOLMES, JR., 1861–1864 70–71 (Mark De Wolfe Howe ed., 1947) (Letter from Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, Jr., to Amelia Holmes (Nov. 16, 1862)).  David Luban has written: “A more 
eccentric foundation for judicial self-restraint than Holmes’s would be hard to find.  A form of 
judicial review based on atheism and cosmic indifference to human aspiration, on the arbitrariness 
of all value judgments, on the contemptibility of attempting to relieve human suffering through 
public policy, and on ‘judicial obedience to a blindly accepted duty’ to speed one’s fellow citizens 
on their self-appointed path to Hell could not survive the test of full publicity.”  David Luban, 
Justice Holmes and the Metaphysics of Judicial Restraint, 44 DUKE L.J. 449, 510 (1994).  See 
generally ALBERT W. ALSCHULER, LAW WITHOUT VALUES: THE LIFE, WORK, AND LEGACY OF 
JUSTICE HOLMES 10 (2000) (concluding that Justice Holmes, who “had a brutal worldview and 
was indifferent to the welfare of others,” has had a largely negative influence on American legal 
thought).  Justice Brandeis had a very different view of democracy.  See, e.g., Vincent Blasi, The 
First Amendment and the Ideal of Civic Courage: The Brandeis Opinion in Whitney v. California, 
29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 653, 686 (1988) (“To Brandeis, as to Jefferson, the key to a successful 
democracy lies in the spirit, the vitality, the daring, the inventiveness of its citizens.”). 
45. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 35 (1921).  See also 
Lewis Henry LaRue, How Not to Imitate John Marshall, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 819, 830 (1999) 
(“[T]hose who teach rhetoric and composition often advise their students to start each paragraph 
with a topic sentence.  Yet it seems fair to say that Marshall’s topic sentence [in McCulloch v. 
Maryland—‘If any one proposition could command the universal assent of mankind, we might 
expect it would be this—that the government of the Union, though limited in its powers, is supreme 
within its sphere of action’—] is rather extreme in the aggressiveness of its statement.  One who 
disagrees seems cast out beyond the pale of mankind.”). 
46. WHITE, supra note 9, at 239. 
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must also be mindful of the public interest, and of the need to preserve 
that balance between freedom and constraint that animates our 
democratic institutions. 
At the risk of grossly oversimplifying the nature of the decisional 
process, one might provisionally divide the questions presented for 
decision by judges into two categories: questions of fact and questions of 
law.47  Assuming the validity of that rough division, it seems clear that 
the “equal hearing” principle must apply to both.  A judge might be 
tempted to fudge the facts for one reason or another (perhaps to make the 
case appear more consistent with one line of authority than another),48 
 
47. The conventional division of issues into questions of law and questions of fact may be useful 
for present purposes, but it also represents a somewhat arid view of adjudication, which is far more 
complicated than this simple dichotomy would allow.  See BURNS, supra note 35, at 215 (citing 
RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTIVITY AND RELATIVISM: SCIENCE, HERMENEUTICS, AND 
PRAXIS 147–48 (1983)) (A judge “does not simply ‘apply’ fixed, determinate laws to particular 
situations [but] must interpret and appropriate precedents and law to each new, particular situation.  
It is by virtue of such considered judgment that the meaning of the law and the meaning of the 
particular case are codetermined.”).  See also Edward H. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning, 
15 U. CHI. L. REV. 501, 501–502 (1948) (“The pretense is that the law is a system of known rules 
applied by a judge . . . . In an important sense legal rules are never clear, and, if a rule had to be 
clear before it could be imposed, society would be impossible. . . . [I]t cannot be said that the legal 
process is the application of known rules to diverse facts.  Yet it is a system of rules; the rules are 
discovered in the process of determining similarity or difference.”). 
48. Of course, various formulations or resolutions of relevant factual issues may permit a judge 
to formulate or resolve legal questions in different ways.  Judges may therefore be tempted to find 
factual questions where none actually exist or to resolve factual disputes in an unnatural way.  Judge 
Charles Hough reportedly emphasized the point by stating that he did not care who laid down the 
law of the land so long as he could find the facts.  See generally Wade H. McCree, Jr., Bureaucratic 
Justice: An Early Warning, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 777, 788 (1981) (discussing Judge Hough’s dictum 
and outlining various changes in the federal judicial process that were aimed at increasing judicial 
efficiency, but arguably undermined the quality of justice).  Monroe Freedman, one of the leading 
authorities on legal and judicial ethics, has suggested that the problem is more widespread than we 
might otherwise be inclined to think.  In a 1989 speech to the Federal Circuit Judicial Conference, 
Professor Freedman observed: “Frankly, I have had more than enough of judicial opinions that bear 
no relationship whatsoever to the cases that have been filed and argued before the judges.  I am 
talking about judicial opinions that falsify the facts of the cases that have been argued, judicial 
opinions that make disingenuous use or omission of material authorities, judicial opinions that 
cover up these things with no-publication and no-citation rules.”  Monroe Freedman, Speech to the 
Seventh Annual Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
(May 24, 1989), reprinted in 128 F.R.D. 409, 439 (1989).  See generally Albert W. Alschuler, How 
Frank Easterbrook Kept George Ryan in Prison, 50 VAL. U. L. REV. 7 (2015) (critiquing, from an 
advocate’s perspective, a court’s assertions concerning the facts, issues, and procedural history 
involved in a particular case); Chicago Council of Lawyers, Evaluation of the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 673, 799 (1994) (“A very substantial 
number of lawyers contacted by the Council believe that Chief Judge Posner routinely ignores 
crucial facts to reach desired conclusions; others believe that he is as faithful to the facts as is any 
appellate judge.  The Council cannot give a firm opinion on this issue without comparing factual 
statements to the records of numerous cases.  However, the fact that many lawyers of high integrity 
and ability strongly believe that Chief Judge Posner does not pay sufficient attention to the facts 
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but misstating or ignoring the evidence is a particularly crude 
manifestation of bias, and the professional community can be expected, 
at least in the long term, to call to account a judge who systematically 
distorts the facts.  For that reason, judges may be unlikely to misstate the 
facts,49 at least consciously, and, if they do, they will probably feel that 
they have done something wrong.  They know that they have not acted as 
judges are supposed to act.  But judges may be more likely to turn a deaf 
ear to legal arguments or interpretative theories that they find 
uncongenial—and they are not likely to feel guilty about that.  For 
example, certain tools or interpretative strategies may have served a judge 
well in the past, and the judge is not likely to give them up just because 
other strategies might arguably provide better tools in a particular case.  
Nor will a judge be eager to reject jurisprudence that he or she has 
contributed to fashioning in the past.  That is especially true, of course, 
where a judge has burnished his or her reputation by trumpeting his or 
her views on particular points of legal doctrine or methodology.  In those 
circumstances, demonstrating an open mind might seem to require that 
something be “walked back.” 
But a full appreciation of the problem necessarily takes us back to 
Justice Rehnquist’s argument in Laird v. Tatum.50  What that argument 
seductively—and erroneously—suggests is that judges do nothing wrong 
when they fail to consider legal arguments they are predisposed to reject.  
What they are doing is not analogous in any way to fudging the facts.  
They are not denying anyone an “equal hearing.”  They are simply 
demonstrating their professional competence.  Their minds are not a 
tabula rasa and they are not meant to be.  On that view, therefore, there 
is no reason for judges to feel guilty about refusing to take seriously legal 
arguments they find uncongenial.  Indeed, they can take comfort in 
 
suggests that this is an area of important concern.”); Anthony D’Amato, The Ultimate Injustice: 
When a Court Misstates the Facts, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 1313 (1990) (critiquing, from an 
advocate’s perspective, a court’s factual assertions in a particular case).  Dissenting judges also 
occasionally criticize a panel majority’s treatment of the facts.  See, e.g., Original Great Am. 
Chocolate Chip Cookie Co. v. River Valley Cookies, Ltd., 970 F.2d 273, 283 (7th Cir. 1992) 
(Cudahy, J., dissenting) (“The majority review of the facts here is so lopsided as to be almost 
droll—if it were not such serious business.”). 
49. That is particularly true of judges who sit on courts whose judgments are regularly reviewed 
by a higher court.  For that reason, federal trial judges may be less likely than federal appellate 
judges to play fast-and-loose with the facts because the decisions of trial courts are regularly 
reviewed, while the decisions of appellate courts (particularly in the federal judicial system at the 
current time) are seldom reviewed at all.  Indeed, the Supreme Court virtually never grants review 
to resolve a factual question, and the suggestion that factual issues may be raised is a strong 
disincentive to the granting of review.  STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 
272–75 (10th ed. 2013). 
50. 409 U.S. 824 (1972) (memorandum opinion of Rehnquist, J.). 
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knowing that they are well prepared for their jobs and are performing 
their duties in an exemplary fashion. 
But that argument is not persuasive.  The “equal hearing” principle 
properly applies to questions of law as well as to questions of fact.  Legal 
issues may present a more difficult set of problems, but the principle 
applies nonetheless.  The proper question is where to draw the line.  Just 
because a completely open mind may signal a lack of professional 
qualification (to say nothing of constituting a human impossibility), it 
does not follow that “anything goes,” or that a completely closed mind 
about the relevant legal doctrine or applicable methodology is consistent 
with judicial duty.  In this respect, if the “equal hearing” principle is to 
be a real and working part of our system of justice, rather than simply a 
pious fiction, we do well to remember that “everything turns,” as Judge 
Hand said, “upon the spirit in which [the judge] approaches the questions 
before him.”51 
Let us turn to two fictional judges whose stories have been told in two 
novels by contemporary novelists who are masters of the literary form.  
Both novels are useful in terms of understanding what it means “to listen” 
in this context. 
II.  THE CHILDREN ACT 
We meet Madam Justice Fiona Maye, an English High Court judge, on 
the first page of The Children Act52—a novel that takes its name from an 
act of Parliament concerned with the welfare of children.53  The act is 
central to the novel because Maye sits as a judge in the Family Division, 
a specialized branch of the High Court that is responsible, among other 
things, for enforcing the act in a broad array of cases that reflect the 
multiculturalism and heterogeneity of London’s population.  When we 
 
51. Hand, supra note 9, at 12. 
52. MCEWAN, supra note 22, at 3.  Although McEwan refers to Madam Justice Maye as “Fiona” 
throughout the novel, and a real High Court judge would be called “Madam Justice Maye,” she will 
be called “Maye” in this essay.  Similarly, Mr. Justice Eamon Redmond, the main character in The 
Heather Blazing will be called “Redmond.” 
53. The Children Act 1989, c. 41, § 1 (Eng.) (providing, in relevant part: “When a court 
determines any question with respect to . . . the upbringing of a child . . . the child’s welfare shall 
be the court’s paramount consideration”).  James Boyd White uses the concept of the “best interests 
of the child” to exemplify the need for conceiving of law “less as a bureaucratic system than as a 
language and a set of relations.”  WHITE, supra note 9, at 133 (“What are the standards by which 
custody is determined when two adults are quarreling over a child, or when the state seeks to 
intervene to protect a child?  The ‘child’s best interests,’ we are told (and this is indeed an advance 
over regarding the child as someone’s property): but how on earth are those ‘best interests’ to be 
determined? . . . Rules that further specify what is meant by the ‘best interests’ . . . have the defect 
that they too are categorical and will be both over-inclusive and under-inclusive.”). 
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meet her, Maye is not in chambers or in the courtroom; she is at home on 
a Sunday evening, “supine on a chaise longue,” surrounded by tasteful 
possessions, “[a] Bokhara rug spread on wide polished floorboards,” and 
a draft judgment on the floor “within her reach.”54  She “was on her back, 
wishing all this stuff at the bottom of the sea.”55 
As we soon learn, Maye is in the midst of a domestic crisis.  She and 
her husband Jack, a professor of ancient history, live alone in Gray’s Inn 
Square, a short walk from the Royal Courts of Justice.56  Jack, who has 
always been “loyal and kind,” has just told Maye that he would like her 
permission to embark on an affair with a young colleague.57  Jack does 
not want a divorce, and would like to keep “everything the same,”58 while 
pursuing the affair.  Jack believes that his situation is dire: he is sixty (he 
says fifty-nine, but Maye corrects him) and this is his “last chance” for 
“one big passionate affair.”59  To drive home the irresistible logic of his 
claim, Jack asks: “Fiona, when did we last make love?”60  She 
dissembles: “I don’t keep a record.”61  But, in truth, she does not know; 
she cannot recall.  It is against this backdrop that the events of the novel 
unfold. 
The personal and the professional are inextricably intertwined in The 
Children Act.  That fact is made clear from the first line of the novel, 
when we are told that the time is “Trinity term, one week old.”62  It is a 
Sunday evening and the judge is at home.  She is not even working on a 
case, but time is measured by the court calendar.  Like the rhythms of the 
church year,63 the court calendar apparently gives meaning to the days of 
 
54. MCEWAN, supra note 22, at 1. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. at 41–45. 
57. Id. at 5–6, 8.  Maye reflects:  
Hurting her and not caring—that was new.  He had always been kind, loyal and kind, 
and kindness, the Family Division daily proved, was the essential human ingredient.  She 
had the power to remove a child from an unkind parent and she sometimes did.  But 
remove herself from an unkind husband?  When she was weak and desolate?  Where was 
her protective judge? 
Id. at 8. 
58. Id. at 6. 
59. Id. 4, 7. 
60. Id. at 4. 
61. Id. at 6. 
62. Id. at 3. 
63. See, e.g., M. Cathleen Kaveny, Billable Hours and Ordinary Time: A Theological Critique 
of the Instrumentalization of Time in Professional Life, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 173, 215 (2001) (“In 
sharp contrast to the way time is viewed in the framework of billable hours, I have described its 
contours in the very different perspective offered by Roman Catholic belief and practice.  Here, 
time is perceived to have intrinsic value rather than merely instrumental value.  Time is viewed not 
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its presbyters.  Later, reflecting on her childlessness, she describes the 
day of her judicial oath taking, when “she knew the game was up; she 
belonged to the law as some women had once been brides of Christ.”64 
The Children Act describes several cases that Maye has decided—or 
soon will decide.  On this Sunday evening, when Maye is trying to come 
to terms with her husband’s declaration of anticipatory infidelity, we are 
introduced to three of her cases.  The first is a case that she had decided 
a few weeks before, but which still intrudes on her thoughts: she had 
allowed the surgical separation of Siamese twins, contrary to their 
parents’ wishes, and one of the twins had died, as expected.  The second 
involves two Jewish schoolgirls whose parents fundamentally disagree 
about the girls’ upbringing.  She has decided the case in favor of the 
mother, but is still revising her written judgment for publication.  Finally, 
a third case intrudes on her evening when her clerk calls to tell her that a 
hospital is seeking a hearing date for a motion to allow the hospital to 
transfuse a seventeen-year-old boy, contrary to his religiously grounded 
objections and those of his parents.65 
 
as a commodity valued in terms of its ability to satisfy human desires, but as a prism that is 
revelatory of the way those desires should ideally be directed (i.e., toward fellowship with God and 
one another).  It is not fungible, but marks points of unique importance in the lives of individual 
persons and the broader community.  It is not an endless, flat extension, but an integral spiral that 
encompasses decision moments, including reversals of direction . . . . Just as importantly, I have 
tried to describe some of the ritualized practices that inscribe those perspectives on time in the lives 
of believers.  The idea that time is an integral spiral is reinforced by the way in which believers 
experience the cyclical nature of the liturgical calendar.  The regular observance of feasts and fasts 
reinforces the conviction that all time is not fungible, that every moment offers its own 
possibilities, which may not return a second time.  The celebration of the sacraments, especially 
the Eucharist, fixes in the minds and hearts of participants the belief that there is some transcendent 
value to their earthly lives.”). 
64. MCEWAN, supra note 22, at 49. 
65. McEwan has written about the circumstances in which he became aware of the real English 
law cases that served as models for those included in the novel.  See Ian McEwan, Law Versus 
Religious Belief, GUARDIAN (Sept. 5, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/books/2014/sep/05/ian-
mcewan-law-versus-religious-belief (“These judgments were like short stories, or novellas; the 
background to some dispute or dilemma crisply summarized, characters drawn with quick strokes, 
the story distributed across several points of view and, towards its end, some sympathy extended 
towards those whom, ultimately, the narrative would not favour.”).  The first case in the novel 
appears to have been based on a 2000 English case involving a dispute between the parents of 
Siamese twins and the twins’ health care providers.  The health care providers wished, contrary to 
the parents’ religious convictions, to perform a surgical separation that would likely result in the 
death of one of the twins.  See Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins) [2000] 4 All ER 961 (permitting 
the surgical separation of conjoined twins contrary to the parents’ wishes).  The case was a matter 
of great public interest and aroused strong opinions in England.  Cormac Cardinal Murphy-
O’Connor, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Westminster, took the unusual step of making a 
submission to the Court of Appeal in the case.  Siamese Twins, Jodie & Mary: A Submission by 
Archbishop Cormac Murphy-O’Connor, Archbishop of Westminster, to the Court of Appeal in the 
Case of Central Manchester Healthcare Trust V Mr and Mrs A and Re A Child (By Her Guardian 
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A.  Matthew and Mark 
In the first case, a London hospital has sought permission to separate 
Siamese Twins named Matthew and Mark.66  The operation necessarily 
would cause the death of Matthew, who lacked the organs necessary to 
live on his own.  Mark, however, would likely live as “a normal healthy 
child.”67  If the twins were not separated, both would die because Mark’s 
heart could not continue to support both circulatory systems.  The twins’ 
parents were devout Catholics who did not believe that they had the right 
to take the life of one child to save the other.68  Their view diverged from 
that of the medical professionals.  The case—and Maye’s handling of it—
were closely watched: 
In part, her memory was of a prolonged and awful din assaulting her 
concentration, a thousand car alarms, a thousand witches in a frenzy, 
giving substance to the cliché: the screaming headline.  Doctors, priests, 
television and radio hosts, newspaper columnists, colleagues, relations, 
taxi drivers, the nation at large had a view.69 
For Maye, “there was only one desirable or less undesirable outcome, 
but a lawful route to it was not easy.  Under pressure of time, with a noisy 
world waiting, she found, in just under a week and thirteen thousand 
words, a plausible way.”70  Her task was made more difficult because she 
found the hospital’s reasoning unpersuasive.  The hospital argued that 
separating the twins was analogous to “turning off Matthew’s life-support 
machine, which was Mark.”71  But the procedure was too invasive and 
could not be analogized to turning off a switch.  “Instead, she found her 
argument in the ‘doctrine of necessity,’ an idea established in common 
law that in certain limited circumstances, which no parliament would ever 
care to define, it was permissible to break the criminal law to prevent a 
 
Ad Litem, The Official Solicitor), DIOCESE OF WESTMINISTER (Sept. 14, 2000), 
http://www.rcdow.org.uk/cardinal/default.asp?library_ref=1&content_ref=45.  M. Cathleen 
Kaveny has provided a thoughtful analysis of the moral and theological issues presented in the case.  
See generally M. Cathleen Kaveny, Conjoined Twins and Catholic Moral Analysis: Extraordinary 
Means and Casuistical Consistency, 12 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 115 (June 2002).  The third case 
in the novel is based on an English case involving a fifteen-year-old child who, in accordance with 
his family’s religious beliefs, refused a transfusion.  See Re E (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical 
Treatment) [1993] 1 FRL 386 (deciding the case of a fifteen-year-old Jehovah’s Witness who 
refused blood transfusion and blood products). 
66. MCEWAN, supra note 22, at 26. 
67. Id. at 27. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. at 28. 
71. Id. at 29. 
6_SULLIVAN_DOCUMENT1.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/10/2017  1:37 PM 
376 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol.  48 
greater evil.”72 
The profession had pronounced Maye’s judgment “elegant and 
correct,” while her mail contained “the venomous thoughts of the 
devout.”73  Most important, Maye “was unhappy, couldn’t leave the case 
alone, was awake at night for long hours, turning over the details, 
rephrasing certain passages of her judgment, taking another tack. . . . 
Those intense weeks left their mark on her, and it had only just faded.  
What exactly had troubled her?”74  She found it difficult to explain the 
effect that this case had had on her: 
How was she to talk about this?  Hardly plausible, to have told [Jack] 
at this stage of a legal career, this one case among so many others, its 
sadness, its visceral details and loud public interest, could affect her so 
intimately.  For a while, some part of her had gone cold along, along 
with poor Matthew.  She was the one who had dispatched a child from 
the world, argued him out of existence in thirty-four elegant pages.75 
It is not difficult to understand the depth of the anguish that Maye 
experienced with respect to this decision itself or the discomfort she 
continues to feel with respect to the reasons she gave for it.  Maye had 
been asked to decide a question of the utmost importance, but one to 
which the law provided no ready answer.  She was therefore required to 
craft an argument and make a decision for herself.  She engaged the issues 
as seriously and as authentically as anyone could, but a satisfactory legal 
answer was not forthcoming.  She was ultimately required to decide the 
case based on the concept of “necessity”—a route to judgment that she 
understandably found unsatisfactory.  She had done everything that she 
 
72. Id.   
[T]he purpose of the surgery was not to kill Matthew but to save Mark.  Matthew, in all 
his helplessness, was killing Mark and the doctors must be allowed to come to Mark’s 
defense to remove a threat of fatal harm.  Matthew would perish after the separation not 
because he was purposefully murdered, but because on his own he was incapable of 
flourishing. 
Id.  One problem with the doctrine of necessity has to do with who should decide when necessity 
trumps the law and on what grounds.  In Billy Budd, for example, Captain Vere found “necessity” 
to exist in the somewhat inchoate demands of military discipline.  See MELVILLE, supra note 25, 
at 79.  See also Regina v. Dudley & Stephens, 14 QBD 273 (1884) (rejecting necessity defense in 
case of cannibalism in shipwreck).  In addition, justification by reference to necessity may signal 
an abandonment of the constraints that law normally imposes.  See, e.g., KAHN, supra note 5, at 43 
(“Legal decision-making differs from other kinds of policy formation in just this way: it always 
begins from a set of sources that already have authority within the community’s past.  Legal 
arguments do not begin by asking about ‘the best outcome, all things considered.’”). 
73. MCEWAN, supra note 22, at 30. 
74. Id.  A few pages before, Maye had told Jack that, if the situation were reversed, she would 
not have found “a man and then open[ed] negotiations,” but would have found out “what was 
troubling you,” whereupon he responded: “So what is troubling you?”  Id. at 25. 
75. Id. at 32. 
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could do, but she was nonetheless uneasy with her decision. 
B.  Rachel and Nora 
The draft judgment that rests on the floor beside Maye in the opening 
scene of the novel involves “[t]he fates of two Jewish schoolgirls.”76  The 
judgment has been delivered orally, and the girls’ situation was thereby 
settled, but “the prose [of the written judgment] needed to be smoothed, 
as did the respect owed to piety in order to be proof against appeal.”77  As 
the evening proceeds, Maye re-reads the draft judgment and continues to 
edit and reflect on it. 
The schoolgirls—Rachel and Nora—are the children of Judith and 
Julian, who “were from the tight folds of the strictly observant Haredi 
community.”78  Julian had hoped for a large family, but Judith was unable 
to conceive again after the second child’s birth.  After recovering from 
depression, Judith “studied at the Open University, gained a good 
qualification and entered on a career in teaching,” a path that “did not suit 
[her husband] or the many relatives.”79  It was not the community’s 
custom to receive much formal education; the men devote themselves to 
the study of Torah, while the women “raise children, the more the better, 
and look after the home.”80  The dispute between Judith and Julian 
seemingly concerned the girls’ schooling, but it really involved “the 
entire context of the girls’ growing up.  It was a fight for their souls.”81 
Judith has sent the girls to a co-educational Jewish school “where 
television, pop music, the Internet and mixing with non-Jewish children 
were permitted,” and she wishes for them to be able to stay on at school 
after the age of sixteen.82  None of this is consistent with the Haredi 
community’s values.  Judith also wanted the girls “to know more about 
how others lived, to be socially tolerant, to have the career opportunities 
she had never had, and as adults to be economically self-sufficient, with 
the chance of meeting the sort of husband with professional skills who 
could help support a family.”83  She believed that “nothing denigrated a 
person, boy or girl, more than the denial of a decent education and the 
dignity of proper work.”84  But Julian sought “to persuade the judge that 
 
76. Id. at 3, 9. 
77. Id. at 9–10. 
78. Id. at 10. 
79. Id. at 11. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. at 12. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. at 14. 
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his wife was a selfish woman with ‘anger management problems’ . . . who 
had turned her back on her marriage vows, argued with his parents and 
her community, cutting the girls off from both.”85 
Maye recognizes that, “[t]he court must choose, on behalf of the 
children, between total religion and something a little less.  Between 
cultures, identities, states of mind, aspirations, sets of family relations, 
fundamental definitions, basic loyalties, unknowable futures.”86  Maye 
resolves these issues by deciding that the girls should continue to attend 
the school chosen by their mother, and that they should remain in school, 
if they so choose, beyond the age of eighteen.  In Maye’s view, her 
judgment “paid respect to the Haredi community [and] the continuity of 
its venerable traditions and observances” and “took no view of its 
particular beliefs beyond noting that they were clearly sincerely held.”87  
She takes comfort in the fact that Julian’s witnesses have undercut his 
case: their testimony as to the community’s expectations for its young 
people “lay well outside mainstream parental practice and the generally 
held view that children should be encouraged in their aspirations.”88  The 
judgment Maye gives is further supported by a social worker’s conclusion 
that the girls would be cut off from their mother if they were returned to 
their father, whereas the opposite was less likely to happen if they 
remained in their mother’s care.89  In this way, Maye takes comfort in her 
ability to rest her decision on factual findings about intermediate issues, 
rather than fully confront the underlying clashes of religious and cultural 
values that her judgment must implicitly resolve. 
Once again, Maye must make a decision, not simply about the fate of 
two young lives, but about giving effect, or not, to the religious values 
and social customs of a community.  Unlike the case of Matthew and 
Mark, there is no conflict between the “welfare” of the two children 
subject to the court’s supervision, so Maye can rely on the statutory 
standard—“the child’s welfare shall be the court’s paramount 
consideration.”90  But how much guidance does that standard really 
afford in a culturally complex case such as this one?  In what sense will 
granting custody to the girls’ mother, or, alternatively, to the girls’ father, 
better advance the girls’ “welfare,” and how is “welfare” to be 
understood, given the particular conflict that exists between the father’s 
 
85. Id. at 13. 
86. Id. at 14. 
87. Id. at 38. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. at 39. 
90. The Children Act 1989, c. 41, § 1 (Eng.). 
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values and the mother’s?  In the end, Maye decides that awarding custody 
to the mother will better advance the girls’ welfare by keeping more 
options open for them to choose from when they reach the age of 
majority.  But this solution is far from perfect.  It depends on implicitly 
choosing between different understandings of “welfare” and on giving 
ultimate effect to one set of contested cultural values; it cannot help but 
lessen the girls’ ties to their religious and cultural tradition.91 
C.  Adam 
Maye’s conversation with her husband Jack on the Sunday evening on 
which the novel opens “had been heading towards excruciating 
frankness,”92 and she was not unhappy when the conversation was 
interrupted by a telephone call from Nigel Pauling, her clerk.  Pauling has 
called to tell her about a case that will require an expedited hearing during 
the coming week: a hospital has applied for authorization to transfuse a 
seventeen-year-old boy, a Jehovah’s Witness, contrary to his wishes and 
those of his family.  Maye tells Pauling to set the case for hearing on 
Tuesday.  She then reflects on the new case and considers visiting the boy 
in hospital, but eventually dismisses the idea as “a sentimental whim”: 
Perhaps it was perverse to discover in this sudden interruption a promise 
of freedom.  On the other side of the city a teenager confronted death 
for his own or his parents’ beliefs.  It was not her business or mission 
to save him, but to decide what was reasonable and lawful.  She would 
have liked to see this boy for herself, remove herself from the domestic 
morass, as well as from the courtroom, for an hour or two, take a 
journey, immerse herself in the intricacies, fashion a judgment formed 
by her own observations.  The parents’ beliefs might be an affirmation 
of their son’s, or a death sentence he dared not challenge.  These days, 
 
91. Somewhat analogous issues were raised in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).  In that 
case, the Supreme Court of the United States held that Amish parents were entitled to withdraw 
their children from school, despite a Wisconsin compulsory attendance law, once the children had 
completed the eighth grade.  Dissenting in part, Justice Douglas argued that the Court erred in 
assuming that “the only interests at stake were those of the Amish parents, on the one hand, and 
State, on the other.”  Yoder, 406 U.S. at 241.  Justice Douglas continued: 
It is the future of the students, not the future of the parents, that is imperiled by today’s 
decision.  If a parent keeps his child out of school beyond the grade school, then the child 
will be forever barred from entry into the new and amazing world of diversity that we 
have today.  The child may decide that that is the preferred course, or he may rebel . . . . 
If he is harnessed to the Amish way of life by those in authority over him and if his 
education is truncated, his entire life may be stunted and deformed.  The child, therefore, 
should be given an opportunity to be heard before the State gives the exemption which 
we honor today. 
Id. at 245–46. 
92. MCEWAN, supra note 22, at 36. 
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finding out for yourself was highly unconventional.  Back in the 1980s 
a judge could still have made the teenager a ward of court and seen him 
in chambers or hospital or at home.  Back then, a noble ideal had 
somehow survived into the modern era, dented and rusty like a suit of 
armour . . . .  Nowadays, social workers . . . did the job and reported 
back.  The old system, slow and inefficient, preserved the human touch.  
Now, fewer delays, more boxes to tick, more to be taken on trust.  The 
lives of children were held in computer memory, accurately, but rather 
less kindly.93 
The hearing occurs on the following Tuesday afternoon.  As Maye 
enters the courtroom, the court rises, and “the last traces, the stain, of 
[Maye’s] own situation vanished completely.  She no longer had a private 
life, she was ready to be absorbed.”94  The hospital and Adam’s parents 
are represented by counsel, as are Adam and the social worker who is his 
guardian ad litem.  Adam is suffering from leukemia; the standard 
treatment consists of a four-drug protocol—two of the drugs inhibit the 
body’s ability to produce blood cells and platelets.  Patients generally are 
transfused for that reason during treatment, but Adam and his parents 
have declined the transfusions on religious grounds.95  The hospital seeks 
the court’s permission to transfuse Adam, notwithstanding his objections 
and those of his parents.  Adam is seventeen years and nine months of 
age;96 if he were eighteen, he would be free to refuse treatment. 
Maye hears testimony from the consulting hematologist, who “gave 
the impression that he considered the court procedure a nonsense and that 
the boy should be dragged by the scruff of his neck to an immediate 
transfusion.”97  She also hears from Adam’s father, who testifies about 
 
93. Id. at 36–37.  In Application of the President and Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 
331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964), a federal appellate court judge famously decided to visit the 
bedside of a hospital patient whose family declined, on religious grounds, to authorize a transfusion 
that the hospital deemed to be medically necessary.  A trial judge had already denied the hospital’s 
emergency application for permission to transfuse the patient, but the appellate court judge granted 
the hospital’s request for relief after his unorthodox exercise in fact-finding.  The appellate court 
judge’s handling of the petition was the subject of considerable discussion.  See ARTHUR SELWYN 
MILLER, A “CAPACITY FOR OUTRAGE”: THE JUDICIAL ODYSSEY OF J. SKELLY WRIGHT 174–88 
(1984).  The legal anthropologist Lawrence Rosen has thoughtfully considered the case from the 
viewpoint of the intersection of law and culture.  See LAWRENCE ROSEN, THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF 
JUSTICE: LAW AS CULTURE IN ISLAMIC SOCIETY 69–73 (1989) (discussing case).  In AC v. 
Manitoba (Director of Child & Family Services), [2009] S.C.R. 181 (Can.), the Supreme Court of 
Canada, over a strong dissent by Justice Ian Binnie, upheld an involuntary transfusion of a girl 
fourteen months short of the age of consent who was deemed by three psychiatrists to be sufficiently 
mature to make the decision for herself. 
94. MCEWAN, supra note 22, at 65. 
95. Id. at 67. 
96. Id. at 75. 
97. Id. at 68. 
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his own background and religious conversion, his love for his son, and 
the strength of his son’s faith.98  On cross-examination of Adam’s father, 
the hospital’s counsel attempts to show that Adam’s actions are motivated 
by fear of being shunned, and by the elders’ intimidation, rather than by 
any deeply held religious conviction.99  The court also hears from 
Marianna Greene, the social worker who has been appointed to serve as 
Adam’s guardian.  She testifies that Adam has emphasized to her that he 
is his “own man” and is “deciding for [him]self.”100  When Maye asks 
for her opinion as to what action the court should take, Greene responds 
that Adam is “clever and articulate, but still very young,” and that “[a] 
child shouldn’t go killing himself for the sake of religion.”101 
In closing arguments, the hospital argues that Adam lacks the maturity 
to make the decision for himself, while the parents’ lawyer argues that 
Adam is “far closer to being an eighteen-year-old than . . . to being 
seventeen” and that he has “repeatedly and consistently made his wishes 
clear.”102  The guardian’s counsel briefly argues that the boy is bright and 
almost eighteen, but still a minor, so it is up to “Her Ladyship to decide 
the weight she should apportion to the boy’s wishes.”103  Maye, who has 
not found the evidence and arguments compelling, abruptly announces 
that she will go to the hospital with Greene, interview Adam, and deliver 
her judgment when she returns: 
Given the unique circumstances of this case, I’ve decided that I would 
like to hear from Adam Henry himself.  It’s not his knowledge of 
scripture that interests me so much as his understanding of his situation, 
and of what he confronts should I rule against the hospital.  Also, he 
should know that he is not in the hands of an impersonal bureaucracy.  
I shall explain to him that I am the one making the decision in his best 
interests.104 
 
98. On cross-examination, the hospital’s counsel also inexplicably attempts to show that the 
Jehovah’s Witnesses’ opposition to transfusions is based on a misunderstanding of scripture.  Id. at 
81, 83. 
99. Id. at 82–84. 
100. Id. at 85. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. at 88. 
103. Id. at 85–91. 
104. Id. at 91.  When she is traveling to the hospital with Adam’s guardian, she observes that: 
This . . . was either about a woman on the edge of a crack-up making a sentimental error 
of professional judgement, or it was about a boy delivered from or into the beliefs of his 
sect by the intimate intervention of the secular court.  She didn’t think it could be both. 
Id. at 95.  Maye’s decision to visit the hospital might also be understood as an exercise in arrogance, 
reflecting a belief that she could understand more about Adam’s situation in a few minutes of 
conversation than trained professionals had been able to do after a period of detailed observation, 
or, alternatively, as the result of a judge’s reasonable frustration at the legal and social welfare 
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Adam’s hospital room is foreign territory.  Unlike the opening of court, 
there is no grand entrance: no one rises; the room does not come to order.  
In these circumstances, it is not surprising that Maye quickly loses 
whatever opportunity she might have had to determine how the interview 
would be structured.  “[T]he boy was already talking to her as she entered, 
the moment was unfurling, or erupting, without her and she was left 
behind in a daze.”105  Adam seems to have the upper hand, luring Maye 
into the conversation he wishes to have, not the conversation that she 
needs or wants to have; her clumsy responses to Adam’s questions 
quickly lead to a conversation about the devil—definitely Adam’s 
territory, not hers.  Eventually, she gains some ground and invites him to 
focus on the consequences that might befall him short of death, such as 
blindness or kidney failure, but an interruption occurs as one of the nurses 
comes into the room.  Maye resumes the conversation by asking Adam 
about his poetry.106  He then reads one of his poems and says that it was 
inspired by a conversation with one of the elders, who told him that, “if 
the worst were to happen [and he were to die], it would have a fantastic 
effect on everyone” and “would fill our church with love.”107 
Maye asks Adam what his parents think and what they say to him.  He 
responds that there is not much to say.  “We know what’s right,” he 
says.108  Maye reflects on this: 
As he said this, looking at her directly, with no particular challenge in 
his voice, she believed him completely, he and his parents, the 
congregation and the elders knew what was right for them.  She felt 
unpleasantly light-headed, emptied out, all meaning gone.  The 
blasphemous notion came to her that it didn’t much matter either way 
whether the boy lived or died.  Everything would be much the same.  
Profound sorrow, bitter regret perhaps, fond memories, then life would 
plunge on and all three would mean less and less as those who loved 
him aged and died, until they meant nothing at all.  Religions, moral 
systems, her own included, were like peaks in a dense mountain range 
seen from a great distance, none obviously higher, more important, truer 
than another.  What was to judge?109 
Shaking her head “to dispel the thought,” Maye begins to ask the 
question she had intended to ask before the nurse came in: “Why exactly 
 
professionals’ inability to provide her with the information that she deemed necessary to do her job 
properly. 
105. Id. at 103. 
106. Id. at 103–11. 
107. Id. at 113. 
108. Id. at 116. 
109. Id. 
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won’t you have a blood transfusion?”110  Adam then holds forth like “the 
star pupil in the school debate.”111  Maye “recognized certain phrases 
from [Adam’s] father.  But Adam spoke them like the discoverer of 
elementary facts, the formulator of doctrine rather than its recipient.”112  
In other words, Adam spoke with authority.113 
Maye explains to Adam that she must decide what is in his best 
interests and asks what he would think if she were to rule that the hospital 
could legally transfuse him against his wishes.  He smiles, saying that he 
would “think My Lady was an interfering busybody.”114  “It was such an 
unexpected change of register, so absurdly understated, and her own 
surprise so obvious to him, that they both began to laugh.”115  The social 
worker is puzzled, but Maye tells Adam that he has made it “pretty clear 
that you know your own mind, as much as any of us ever can.”116 
Adam has been learning to play the violin while in hospital and Maye 
asks to see his violin.  “She hadn’t intended for him to play, but she 
couldn’t stop him.  His illness, his innocent eagerness made him 
impregnable.”117  He plays a sad Irish air—Benjamin Britten’s setting of 
Yeats’s poem of lost love, Down by the Salley Gardens.  It is a song Maye 
knows well. 
The melancholy tune and the manner in which it was played, so hopeful, 
so raw, expressed everything she was beginning to understand about the 
boy . . . . Hearing Adam play stirred her, even as it baffled her.  To take 
up the violin or any instrument was an act of hope, it implied a future.118 
Being moved, she makes a proposal “far removed from anything she 
would have expected of herself, and which risked undermining her 
authority”: she proposes that Adam play the tune again while she sings 
the words, which he does not know.119  The social worker gets “to her 
feet, frowning, perhaps wondering whether she should intervene.”120 
 
110. Id. 
111. Id. at 117. 
112. Id. 
113. The biblical allusion in the expression “formulator of doctrine” is clear.  See Matthew 7:29 
(King James) (1973) (“For he taught them as one having authority, and not as the scribes.”).  Soon 
after, Maye expresses concern that she may be jeopardizing her own authority when she proposes 
singing to Adam’s accompaniment.  See MCEWAN, supra note 22, at 120 (noting Maye’s shock 
and concern when she finds herself making this impulsive suggestion). 
114. Id. at 117–18. 
115. Id. at 118. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. at 119. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. at 120. 
120. Id. 
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On the first verse they were tentative, almost apologetic, but on the 
second, their eyes met and, forgetting all about [the social worker], who 
was now standing by the door, looking on amazed, [Maye] sang louder 
and Adam’s clumsy bowing grew bolder, and they swelled into the 
mournful spirit of the backward-looking lament.121 
Maye delivers her judgment at 9:15 that evening.  She addresses each 
of the three arguments presented against the hospital’s application: That 
Adam was only three months short of his eighteenth birthday, highly 
intelligent, understood the consequences of his decision, and should be 
treated as “Gillick competent”;122 that refusing medical treatment was a 
fundamental human right with which a court should not lightly interfere; 
and that his religious faith was genuine and should be respected.123  
Notwithstanding her statement to Adam—that it is “pretty clear that you 
know your own mind, as much as any of us ever can”124—Maye rules in 
favor of the hospital.  Maye finds that Adam’s “welfare is better served 
by his love of poetry, by his newly found passion for the violin, by the 
exercise of his lively intelligence and the expressions of a playful, 
affectionate nature, and by all of life and love that lie ahead of him.”125  
Granting the hospital’s application, she observes: 
I find that A, his parents and the elders of the church have made a 
decision which is hostile to A’s welfare, which is this court’s paramount 
consideration. . . . He must be protected from his religion and from 
himself.  This has been no easy matter to resolve.  I have given due 
weight to A’s age, to the respect due to faith and to the dignity of the 
individual embedded in the right to refuse treatment.  In my judgement, 
his life is more precious than his dignity.126 
Following his successful treatment, Adam writes to Maye, telling her 
that he was very upset when he was told of her decision, but that his 
parents were overjoyed—a reaction that caused him to question the depth 
of their faith.127  Adam tells Maye that he has abandoned his faith, that 
 
121. Id. at 120–21. 
122. See Gillick v. W. Norfolk & Wisbech Area Health Auth. [1985] 3 All ER 402 (HL) (stating 
the test for determining whether a child under the age of sixteen is sufficiently mature to consent 
to medical treatment without the intervention of a parent).  Technically, Gillick does not apply to 
Adam’s situation because it addresses the question of consent to treatment, rather than the right to 
refuse treatment, but the parties have discussed it by way of analogy. 
123. MCEWAN, supra note 22, at 123–24. 
124. Id. at 118. 
125. Id. at 126–27. 
126. Id. at 127. 
127. Id. at 144 (“They were so happy, hugging me, and hugging each other and praising God 
and sobbing.  I was feeling too weird and I didn’t work it out for a day or two.  I didn’t even think 
about it.  Then I did.  Have your cake and eat it! . . . [T]hey can have me alive without any of us 
being [excommunicated].  Transfused, but not our fault!  Blame the judge, blame the godless 
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he reads Down by the Salley Gardens every day, and that he “daydream[s] 
about us, impossible wonderful fantasies, like we go on a journey 
together round the world in a ship.”128  Maye prepares a response, but 
does not mail it.  She later receives a second letter, not mailed to her 
chambers this time, but left on the doormat of her flat.  Adam says that 
he feels like “the top of my head has exploded,” with “[a]ll kinds of things 
. . . coming out.”129  He does not mean to harass her, but he needs to talk 
to her.130  Maye asks for a report from the social worker, which is 
positive, and she decides not to respond to Adam’s letter.131 
Later, when Maye is to sit in Newcastle, Adam follows her there, 
arriving at the visiting judges’ residence during a heavy rain.132  She finds 
the beauty of his face distracting.133  Adam tells Maye that he has left 
home after “a huge row” with his father, and he tries to explain his 
motivation for refusing to be transfused.  He felt “pure and good,” he 
says, when he rebuffed the efforts of the nurses and doctors to persuade 
him to accept the transfusion, and he liked it that his parents and elders 
were proud of him.134  He even “rehearsed making a video, like suicide 
bombers do,” and he liked to imagine his funeral, with “everyone 
weeping, everyone proud of me and loving me.”135  When she asks where 
God was in this, he replies: “Behind everything.  These were his 
 
system, blame what we sometimes call ‘the world.’”).  When they meet later, Adam tells Maye that 
he is “full of Yeats.”  Id. at 170.  Of course, the phrase “the world” recalls Yeats’s “Adam’s Curse.”  
See WILLIAM BUTLER YEATS, Adam's Curse, in W.B. YEATS, COLLECTED POEMS 78 (1956).  
(“For to articulate sweet sounds together/ Is to work harder than all these, and yet/ Be thought an 
idler by the noisy set/ Of bankers, schoolmasters, and clergymen/ The martyrs call the world.”).  In 
Adam’s final poem, he also makes ironic use of at least one other Yeats poem.  Compare MCEWAN, 
supra note 22, at 180 (referencing the poem, The Ballad of Adam Henry), with MCEWAN, supra 
note 22, at 138 (referencing the poem, The Song of Wandering Aengus).  See YEATS, supra, at 57.  
See also MCEWAN, supra note 22, at 164 (“When I saw my parents crying like that, really crying, 
crying and sort of hooting for joy, everything collapsed.  But this is the point.  It collapsed into the 
truth.  Of course they don’t want me to die!  They love me.  Why didn’t they say that, instead of 
going on about the joys of heaven?  That’s when I saw it as an ordinary human thing.  Ordinary 
and good.  It wasn’t about God at all.”). 
128. Id. at 145. 
129. Id. at 148. 
130. Id. 
131. Id. at 148–49. 
132. Id. at 161. 
133. Id. at 162–63 (“As he looked away from her to order in his thoughts the sequence of events, 
she wondered if this was what her mother would have called an old-fashioned face.  A meaningless 
idea.  Everyone’s notion of the face of a Romantic poet, a cousin of Keats or Shelley.”); see also 
id. at 163 (“The ceiling light . . . heightened the contours of his cheekbones and lips, and picked 
out the fine twin ridges of his philtrum.  It was a beautiful face.”). 
134. Id. at 166. 
135. Id. 
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instructions I was obeying.  But it was mostly about the delicious 
adventure I was on, how I would die beautifully and be adored.”136 
Adam tells Maye that her “visit [to the hospital] was one of the best 
things that ever happened,” and that his “parents’ religion was a poison 
and you were the antidote.”137  On the other hand, he acknowledges that 
Maye had not spoken against his parents’ religion, but simply acted like 
a “grown-up,” just “ask[ing] questions and listen[ing].”138  Adam says: 
“It’s this thing you have. . . . A way of thinking and talking.”139  When 
Adam eventually tells Maye that he wants to come and live with her, she 
tells him that he must leave.140  She arranges for Pauling to book Adam 
into a hotel for the night and buy him a railway ticket for tomorrow’s train 
to Birmingham, where he intends to stay with an aunt.  As they part, she 
intends to kiss him on the cheek, but they accidentally kiss on the lips.141 
Maye later worries that someone may have seen them kiss and that she 
will be subject to disciplinary action.142  But the truth is more serious.  
Adam’s leukemia returns, and, having achieved legal majority, he 
exercises his right not to be transfused.143  That action may be seen in 
different ways.  In one sense, Adam has killed himself.  In another, he 
has asserted his dignity and autonomy.  Before dying, Adam sends Maye 
a poem in which he portrays her as Satan and recounts the kiss: “Her kiss 
was the kiss of Judas, her kiss betrayed my name.”144  She does not 
respond.145 
 
136. Id.  Adam compares what he did in the name of religion to the conduct of an anorexic 
friend who died: “Yeah, well, actually, anorexia’s a bit like religion. . . . Oh, you know, wanting to 
suffer, loving the pain and sacrifice, thinking that everyone’s watching and caring and that the 
whole universe is all about you.  And your weight!”  Id. at 167. 
137. Id. at 168. 
138. Id. at 169–70. 
139. Id. at 168. 
140. Id. at 172. 
141. Id. at 174. 
142. Id. at 180. 
143. Id. at 217. 
144. Id. at 188. 
145. Id. at 189.  At the time Maye thought it “only kindness, not to send him a letter.”  Id.  “He’d 
write by return, he’d be at her door and she’d have to turn him away again.”  Id.  After reading the 
poem, but before learning about his death, Maye thinks: 
He would soon move on.  Either he had drifted back into religion, or [the allusions to] 
Judas, Jesus and the rest were poetic devices to dramatise her awful behavior, kissing 
him then packing him off in a taxi [with Pauling].  Whichever it was, Adam Henry was 
likely to succeed brilliantly at his postponed exams and go to a good university.  She 
would fade in his thoughts, become a minor figure in the progress of his sentimental 
education. 
Id. 
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D.  Some Observations on Judging in The Children Act 
It is tempting to take away from The Children Act some thoughts about 
judging that are quite harsh: Maye stepped too far out of her assigned role 
in the judicial bureaucracy; she acted unwisely in focusing on the 
humanity of judging; and serious negative consequences followed.  But 
that seems too simplistic.  The lessons to be drawn from the three 
principal cases presented in the novel,146 including the case of Adam 
Henry, are more complex and nuanced than a simple condemnation of 
Maye’s understanding of the judicial role would allow.  Even Maye’s 
stumbles occur within a context defined by her view that judges are 
personally responsible for their work and must make decisions based on 
their own listening.  Each of the three cases presents a complex cultural 
problem that does not give rise to a straightforward legal question that 
can be readily answered by resort to the language of the governing statute.  
In each case, the statutory mandate—that “the child’s welfare shall be the 
court’s paramount consideration”—cannot itself resolve the case.  The 
statutory language merely sets the stage for consideration of the central 
question: What counts, in this particular context, for the true “welfare” of 
the child, and how do we know it?  There is no self-evidently “right 
answer” for the judge to find, and we cannot fault Maye on that basis.  In 
the end, we must judge Maye based on the seriousness with which she 
exercises the responsibility that she has been given and with which she 
encounters the issues that she must decide. 
In the case of the Siamese Twins, the question for decision is simply 
stated, if not so simply resolved: Should law intervene and afford one of 
the twins the possibility of life, which necessarily will cause the death of 
the other, or should nature be allowed to take its course, in which case 
both twins will die?  What may be conducive to the welfare of one is not 
arguably consistent with the welfare of the other.  The matter is before 
the court, of course, because there is disagreement among those 
responsible for protecting the welfare of the children.  The twins’ parents, 
who love both of them, believe that choosing one of the twins to live, the 
other to die, would violate God’s law.  The hospital’s function is to 
 
146. There are several other cases mentioned in the book, namely those that are part of her call 
on the day following the Sunday evening events that open the book.  In one, the justice system is 
helpless in the face of a Moroccan father’s removal of his daughter from the jurisdiction.  Id. at 51.  
Another involves a woman seeking maintenance.  Id. at 57.  A third involves an ex parte application 
for an order excluding a husband from the matrimonial home.  Id. at 58.  Maye is dismissive because 
the husband has not been consulted, let alone served.  Id. at 58.  Ironically, Maye has solved her 
own problem simply by having the locks to her flat changed.  Id.  at 52–53.  Another involves a 
man who feared violence from his ex-wife’s boyfriend.  Id. at 54–58.  Yet another involves a 
mother’s application to have her children’s passports lodged with the court.  Id. 
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preserve life.  In its view, therefore, saving the life of one is better than 
letting both die. 
Although Maye believes that “there was only one desirable or less 
undesirable outcome,”147 she cannot accept the hospital’s argument and 
therefore turns to a different source—the principle that law may be 
violated “to prevent a greater evil.”148  Her colleagues find that move 
“elegant and correct.”149  But to rely on the principle of “necessity” is to 
invoke a term that has the aura, but not necessarily the reality, of being 
grounded in legal principle.150  It obscures rather than illuminates an 
unavoidable moral choice. 
Maye herself is not satisfied: “[S]he was unhappy, couldn’t leave the 
case alone, was awake at night for long hours, turning over the details, 
rephrasing certain passages of her judgment, taking another tack.”151  
What is troubling her? “She was the one who had dispatched a child from 
the world, argued him out of existence in thirty-four elegant pages.”152  
If she had decided otherwise, would she have felt responsible for 
dispatching two children from the world, arguing two of them out of 
existence?  What are we to make of this?  Are we to think that Maye’s 
thoughts are those of a person temperamentally unsuited to judging—or 
of a judge who understands the significance of her role, the difficulty of 
the decisions she must make, and the moral obligation that she has to act 
for proper reasons that can be explained? 
Maye seems to decide the case of the Jewish schoolgirls with greater 
“spiritual quiet,”153 although the issues presented in that case, as Maye 
recognizes, are neither easy nor insignificant: “The Court must choose, 
on behalf of the children, between total religion and something a little 
less.  Between cultures, identities, states of mind, aspirations, sets of 
family relations, fundamental definitions, basic loyalties, unknowable 
futures.”154  Once again, there is a profound cultural and religious conflict 
at the root of the case that Maye is being asked to decide.  The children’s 
mother has moved beyond the boundaries of their Jewish sect.  But their 
 
147. Id. at 28. 
148. Id. at 29. 
149. Id. at 30. 
150. See supra text accompanying note 72 (discussing problems of reliance on “necessity”). 
151. Id. at 30. 
152. Id. at 32. 
153. See McCree, supra note 48, at 797 (“A great judge of the Second Circuit, Charles M. 
Hough, once wrote that ‘the legal mind must assign some reason in order to decide anything with 
spiritual quiet.’” (quoting U.S. Asphalt Refining Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 222 Fed. 
1006, 1008 (S.D.N.Y. 1915))). 
154. MCEWAN, supra note 22, at 14. 
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father has not.  And he does not want his children to be brought up in a 
culture foreign to what he has known.  The continued existence of a 
human life is not at stake here.  What is at stake, however, are the cultural 
and religious identities of two little girls, as well as the values—and 
perhaps the survival—of a community and a way of life. 
Maye’s relative comfort in deciding the case in favor of the mother 
rests in part on Maye’s ability to hear and evaluate the witnesses who 
support the father’s position.  Their testimony concerning the 
community’s expectations for young people “lay well outside 
mainstream parental practice.”155  Moreover, expert testimony suggested 
an important lack of symmetry: it would be easier for the girls to maintain 
contact with their father’s family if their mother were given custody than 
it would be for them to maintain contact with their mother if custody were 
given to their father; and it would be easier for them to move from their 
mother’s world to their father’s, if they so chose, once they came of 
age.156  One option therefore seemed more final and irremediable than 
the other.  “Above all, the duty of the court was to enable the children to 
come to adulthood and make their own decisions about the sort of life 
they wished to lead.”157  Significantly, Maye does not consider speaking 
directly to the girls whose lives she may be determining.  The ordinary 
processes of adjudication—listening to witnesses in court, evaluating 
their testimony, and coming to conclusions based on that evaluation—
point Maye in the direction of what may be the less bad outcome.  They 
also deflect attention from the underlying cultural conflict.  Legal 
processes make the case seem more manageable and amenable to 
resolution. 
But Maye’s immediate response to hearing about the case of Adam 
Henry is to think about going to the hospital, spending “an hour or two” 
with him, determining for herself whether his refusal to be transfused is 
the result of his own decision or “a death sentence [imposed by his 
parents’ religion] that he dared not challenge,” and then “fashion[ing] a 
judgment formed by her own observations.”158  Perhaps that immediate 
reaction is simply the product of a desire to escape from her 
unsatisfactory domestic situation, but it may also be due to her personal 
inability to credit the idea that someone could rationally and freely choose 
 
155. Id. at 38. 
156. Id. at 39. 
157. Id.  Of course, the girls’ schooling might predispose them to reject the values of their 
father’s community in a way that would not have happened if they had been able to grow up as part 
of that community. 
158. Id. at 36. 
6_SULLIVAN_DOCUMENT1.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/10/2017  1:37 PM 
390 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol.  48 
death over life because of an abstract religious principle.  That idea is 
simply too foreign and too incomprehensible for her to grasp.  But she 
dismisses the possibility of visiting the hospital as a “sentimental 
whim.”159  “These days,” a judge’s “finding out for [her]self [is] highly 
unconventional.”160 
Once Maye has heard the evidence and argument, however, she 
reconsiders her position.  What she has heard has not been helpful in 
terms of the decision she must make: the consulting hematologist 
obviously thinks that no one—of whatever age or station—should ever 
be permitted to act against professional medical advice, while Adam’s 
parents sincerely believe that transfusions are contrary to God’s will. 
The court must make a decision based on its understanding of Adam’s 
welfare.  When all is said and done, however, what is Adam’s welfare, 
and how is it to be protected?  Should the law permit Adam to make the 
decision for himself?  Should the court enter an order permitting the 
hospital to preserve Adam’s life against his professed wishes, and those 
of his parents, or should he be allowed to die and thereby vindicate his 
interests in autonomy and dignity?  All this, of course, has to do not with 
welfare in the abstract, or with the value of life in the abstract, but with 
the welfare of a particular person and the value of a particular life. 
Is Maye’s decision to make her own inquiry into Adam’s motivation 
simply an impetuous action taken amidst trying personal circumstances?  
Maye herself entertains that possibility on her way to the hospital, when 
she observes that her decision might well be that of “a woman on the edge 
of a crack-up making a sentimental error of professional judgment.”161  
Or is it the decision of an arrogant judge who believes that she can better 
evaluate Adam’s capacity in a short time than trained professionals have 
been able to do by following their detailed, established protocols?  Or is 
it the manifestation of an understandable frustration that the professionals 
have not been helpful in her effort to reach an appropriate result?  Those 
are additional possibilities. 
Certainly, the decision to interview Adam is problematic in several 
respects: Maye announces the decision peremptorily; she gives the 
lawyers no opportunity to object or offer suggestions as to the proper 
procedure to be followed; she conducts the interview ex parte, without 
having the lawyers present; she makes no record of the interview; and she 
simply announces her conclusions on her return, without giving the 
 
159. Id. at 37. 
160. Id. at 36. 
161. Id. at 95. 
6_SULLIVAN_DOCUMENT1.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/10/2017  1:37 PM 
2016] Just Listening 391 
lawyers any opportunity to make any further arguments in response to 
what she believes that she has learned by interviewing Adam.  Because it 
is now “highly unconventional” for judges to “find out for 
[themselves],”162 there seems to be no established protocol for 
conducting such an interview, and Maye gives little thought to what kind 
of process might be required.  In that sense, her conduct may well seem 
impetuous and unprofessional. 
But there is more to be said than that.  In view of the virtually certain 
consequences of a refusal to be transfused, the question whether legal 
effect should be given to Adam’s professed wishes is as serious an 
existential decision as most judges are likely to face.  Moreover, the 
proper course of action had not become clear, in Maye’s view, from the 
trial evidence and arguments.  In these circumstances, it is not surprising 
that Maye should feel obliged to see Adam for herself.  Nor is it 
surprising, given the stakes, that Maye should think that Adam should see 
her—that he is entitled to see the person who is to make this uniquely 
important decision and be reassured that his fate is “not in the hands of 
an impersonal bureaucracy.”163  If Maye is to “listen” to Adam’s case in 
an authentic way, seeing him for herself seems to be a reasonable—even 
necessary—first step. 
But how is one to judge all that ensues?  One might conclude that 
Adam’s story does not have a happy ending, although that is debatable, 
given the fullness of the life that he is able to live in the immediate 
aftermath of Maye’s intervention.  It is debatable for the additional, and 
perhaps more important, reason that Maye’s intervention ultimately 
affords Adam the opportunity to make his own choice about life or death, 
and thereby vindicate his interests in dignity and autonomy.  If the end of 
the story is deemed to be an unhappy one, however, it is not because of 
Maye’s decision to visit the hospital at all, but because of her failure to 
plan adequately for it, and because of what happens during and after the 
visit.  By identifying so closely with Adam, letting him set the agenda, 
and expressing too intimate an interest in his poetry and music, Maye 
may have gone too far in betraying her own authority: an escape from 
bureaucratic judging need not have entailed the singing of a sorrowful 
love song to the accompaniment of Adam’s violin.  Maye recognizes at 
the time that she may be undercutting her authority, and she certainly 
underestimates the effect that her demonstration of interest will have on 
this very needy boy.  Even so, one cannot help thinking that Maye’s 
strategy (whether arrogant, unprofessional, or simply ill-advised) might 
 
162. Id. at 36. 
163. Id. at 91. 
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have been thought brilliant if it had succeeded—and Adam had chosen to 
live, once the decision was his to take. 
It may be that Maye crossed the line in their interview, but the main 
harm seems to have been done later.  Having shown kindness to Adam, 
Maye does not know how to respond to the emotions that her kindness 
has released in him.  She obviously cannot let him come and live with 
her, as he proposes, but her response to his show of admiration and 
affection is clumsy and inadequate.  Her fears concerning the possible 
professional consequences of their kiss seem somehow unworthy.  
Perhaps it is time for Maye to fall back on the social welfare bureaucracy 
(or to try and recover the formalism and impersonality of the law), when 
Adam begins to write to her, and then tracks her down at the visiting 
judges’ lodge in Newcastle.  But Maye does not do that.  In an important 
sense, the problem is not that Maye chose to listen, but that she ceased to 
listen and did not speak. 
III.  THE HEATHER BLAZING 
In The Heather Blazing,164 Colm Tóibín paints a vivid portrait of the 
intimate and professional lives of Eamon Redmond, a respected judge of 
the Irish High Court.  As in The Children Act, the personal and the 
professional are deeply connected.  In addition, Redmond and Maye are 
both High Court judges in very similar legal systems; they share a 
common professional identity and status, but differ in gender, nationality, 
and generation. 
Unlike Maye, who sits in a specialized court in the former center of 
empire, and necessarily deals with the legacy of empire in the 
multiculturalism and heterogeneity of her clientele, Redmond sits as a 
judge of general jurisdiction in Dublin, the small capital city of a small 
country—a former possession of the imperial power.  The cultural 
complexity that Redmond faces may be less obvious, but no less real.  It 
stems from the transformation of Ireland from one kind of society to 
another.  During the course of the novel, Redmond will be required to 
pass judgment in a number of cases, some more easily than others. 
As with Maye, we make Redmond’s acquaintance on the first page of 
the novel.  Unlike our initial meeting with Maye, we do not meet 
Redmond in the drawing room, but in the courthouse. 
Nearing the end of his career, Redmond is not unaware that his 
professional success owes as much to his family’s service to the long-
ruling Fianna Fáil party as to his own considerable gifts.  Redmond’s 
 
164. TÓIBÍN, supra note 23. 
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grandfather was detained during the rebellion of 1916.165  His father and 
uncle participated in the Civil War beside those who would later lead the 
party,166 and they remained staunch party members throughout their 
lives.  Redmond himself was “noticed” by the party before he entered 
university,167 and it was in the course of party canvassing that he met and 
courted Carmel, the woman who would become his wife.168  For most of 
Redmond’s life, the government would be in the hands of the Fianna Fáil 
party.169  From his earliest days at the bar, therefore, the party was able 
to groom him for eventual elevation to the bench.  The government 
included him in important cases when he was still a junior counsel and 
saw to it that he became a Senior Counsel at an early age.  He soon 
became the party’s leading constitutional lawyer.170 
 
165. Id. at 68. 
166. Id. at 168–69.  Indeed, we soon learn that Redmond was named for Eamon de Valera, the 
party leader.  Id. at 25.  The fictional family’s republican roots run deep in County Wexford, which 
was the focal point of the Rebellion of 1798.  See generally THOMAS PAKENHAM, THE YEAR OF 
LIBERTY: THE GREAT IRISH REBELLION OF 1798 (1969) (providing an account of the Rebellion of 
1798).  See also J.K. CASEY & TURLOUGH O’CAROLAN, BY THE RISING OF THE MOON, on SONGS 
OF IRELAND (2002), http://www.thebards.net/music/lyrics/Rising_Of_The_Moon.shtml (song 
memorializing the Irish Rebellion of 1798).  Redmond’s father, a schoolteacher, has a keen interest 
in the history of Wexford and has organized a museum to celebrate the exploits of those who fought 
in 1798.  TÓIBÍN, supra note 23, at 21–22, 24–25.  In later years, Redmond is somewhat reticent 
about disclosing the nature or extent of his family’s participation in the Civil War.  Id. at 175–76. 
167. Id. at 168–70. 
168. Id. at 159–60, 170. 
169. In 1982, Basil Chubb, a prominent political scientist, commented on the great stability of 
parliamentary governments in Ireland during the twentieth century, which he explained in part by 
the long-standing dominance of Fianna Fáil after achieving its first majority government in 1932: 
Even though, as has usually been the case, parliamentary majorities have been small and 
usually to be counted on the fingers of one hand, the history of almost 60 years up to 
1980 included two unbroken periods of sixteen years each (1932–48 and 1957–73) and 
one of ten years (1922–32).  Between 1922 and 1977, governments with majorities of 
their own party supporters were in office for almost forty-one years, minority 
governments for only fourteen.  This is a record of great stability.  To what extent it can 
be attributed to the electoral system or be said to be in spite of it is another matter. 
Clearly, the salient factor has been, to repeat, the critical size and great stability of Fianna 
Fáil support for nearly half a century. 
BASIL CHUBB, THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF IRELAND 149–50 (2d ed. 1982).  See also id. 
at 148 tbl.8.3 (Irish Governments, September 1922–June 1977)).  Conor Cruise O’Brien has 
described the formation of a coalition government in 1948 as “the greatest change in the political 
life of the new state since Fianna Fáil’s victory in 1932.”  CONOR CRUISE O’BRIEN, MEMOIR: MY 
LIFE AND THEMES 133 (1998).  The 1948 coalition government was significant for several reasons, 
not the least of which was that it marked the brief return to power of Fine Gael, the ideological 
successor to Cumann na nGaedheal, the party which (unlike Fianna Fáil) had supported the Anglo-
Irish Treaty of 1921.  See PAUL BEW, IRELAND: THE POLITICS OF ENMITY 1789–2006 416–43 
(2007) (discussing the Anglo-Irish Treaty and the alignment of parties around the Treaty); CALTON 
YOUNGER, IRELAND’S CIVIL WAR 512 (1968) (same). 
170. TÓIBÍN, supra note 23, at 212–13, 218.  In A Brush With The Law, Tóibín describes 
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At home, the man of words is often silent.171  By the time the story 
opens,172 Carmel believes that she really does not understand him,173 and 
his relationships with his two adult children are fraught.  Redmond soon 
learns that his unmarried daughter Niamh, who works as a statistician in 
Dublin, is pregnant; she will give birth to a son as the novel progresses.174  
Redmond is not pleased.  Having children outside of marriage would have 
been a serious matter in Ireland at the time.  And Redmond strongly 
disapproves of the kind of legal career that his barrister son Donal has 
chosen.  In Redmond’s view, Donal would fare better at the bar if he did 
not associate himself with progressive political and social causes.175 
But the subject of Tóibín’s novel is not strictly limited to the intimate 
and professional lives of the Honorable Mr. Justice Redmond.  Through 
the cases he discusses, Tóibín also paints a vivid portrait of Ireland 
itself—a nation in the midst of a profound transformation from a 
relatively closed, inward-looking, traditional society to a modern 
European nation, increasingly indistinguishable in important ways from 
many of its neighbors.176  Indeed, the novel situates itself at the 
 
conversations he had with judges and lawyers at the Four Courts, the seat of the judiciary and the 
bar in Dublin, before writing The Heather Blazing.  He notes that he “listened carefully to the Fine 
Gael side, realizing that they had held power in the Four Courts between the foundation of the state 
and 1961 but had lost it now and were puzzled as to how this had come about.”  Tóibín, A Brush 
with the Law, supra note 2, at 29.  The year 1961 marked the beginning of a new era for the Irish 
courts, as Mr. Justice Gerard Hogan has written: 
The generation of judges who sat on the High and Supreme Courts in the 40s and 50s 
were, for the most part, steeped in the British tradition of parliamentary sovereignty.  The 
judgments of that era seem staid and unadventurous to the modern reader. . . . The 
appointment [by Fianna Fáil Prime Minister Sean Lemass] of Cearbhall O’Dalaigh as 
Chief Justice in 1961 heralded the beginning of a new era. . . . Both he and Mr. Justice 
[Brian] Walsh were determined to make a fresh start and to release the Irish legal system 
from the state of almost servile dependency on English judicial developments into which 
it had lapsed. 
Gerard Hogan, Irish Nationalism as a Legal Ideology, 75 STUD. 528, 531–32 (Winter 1986).  See 
also Brian Girvin, Church, State, and Society in Ireland Since 1960, 43 ÉIRE/IRELAND 74, 78 
(Spring/Summer 2008) (“When the Irish government appointed Cearbhall O Dálaigh as Chief 
Justice and Brian Walsh as a member of the Supreme Court in December 1961, [Prime Minister 
Sean] Lemass told them that he wanted the Supreme Court to be ‘more like the United States 
Supreme Court.’  The two judges believed that Lemass wanted them to take a more flexible view 
of the constitution.”). 
171. TÓIBÍN, supra note 23, at 220–21. 
172. The book begins two years before the point at which it concludes, but the progression is 
not linear.  The recent past proceeds in chapters alternated with chapters that recount events in the 
past. 
173. Id. at 152–54. 
174. Id. at 11, 94–98. 
175. Id. at 113–14. 
176. See DIARMAID FERRITER, THE TRANSFORMATION OF IRELAND 1900–2000 536–759 
(2005) (discussing developments in Ireland from 1960 to 2000); see generally ROY F. FOSTER, 
6_SULLIVAN_DOCUMENT1.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/10/2017  1:37 PM 
2016] Just Listening 395 
intersection of these two portraits, as Redmond, the man and the judge, 
affects and is affected by that transformational change.177 
The Heather Blazing is organized around three decision days at the end 
of three consecutive court years.  As was true in The Children Act, three 
principal cases provide the focus for the professional aspect of The 
Heather Blazing. 
A.  The First End of Term Decision Day 
When we first meet Eamon Redmond, he is standing at the window of 
his chambers in the Four Courts, looking down at the street traffic and the 
waters of the River Liffey.  It is the last day of the court term.178  
Redmond thinks back to earlier years, when terrorism was a serious 
threat, particularly for judges who tried terrorism cases (as Redmond did), 
and security officials insisted that judges check for explosives under their 
cars in the judges’ car park before getting in and turning the ignition 
key.179  Today he has motions to hear and a judgment to deliver in a 
 
LUCK AND THE IRISH: A BRIEF HISTORY OF CHANGE FROM 1970 (2008) (discussing developments 
in Ireland since 1970).  The Heather Blazing was published in 1992 and the main events of the 
novel appear to be set in a period shortly before that time.  Ireland has continued to change 
dramatically, and in numerous ways, since that period.  See, e.g., Girvin, supra note 170, at 75 
(further discussing recent changes in Irish society); Brian Girvin, Continuity, Change and Crisis in 
Ireland: An Introduction and Discussion, 23 IRISH POL. STUD. 457 (2008) (discussing dramatic 
changes in Ireland over the preceding two decades). 
177. An interesting point of intersection between Redmond’s personal and professional lives 
comes with the second case, which involves a challenge to the treatment of an unwed mother.  See 
TÓIBÍN, supra note 23, at 86 (discussing a case before Redmond regarding the treatment of an 
unwed pregnant woman who moved in with the father of her child, who was himself separated 
from, but still married to, his wife).  Indeed, given Redmond’s daughter’s situation, together with 
the volatility of the issue in Ireland at the time, one wonders whether Redmond should have recused 
himself in the case. 
178. Id. at 3–4. 
179. Id. at 3–4, 177.  The Special Criminal Court sits in Dublin.  It was originally created to 
hear cases involving terrorism, but its jurisdiction was more recently expanded to include organized 
crime cases as well.  The Special Criminal Court is unlike other Irish trial courts in several respects, 
including the fact that the court consists of three judges, who sit without a jury.  See generally 
FERGAL F. DAVIS, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE SPECIAL CRIMINAL COURT, 1922–
2005 (2007) (describing the organization and history of the Special Criminal Court from its 
inception).  See also Paul O’Mahony, The Constitution and Criminal Justice, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
IN IRELAND 72, 80–83 (Paul O’Mahony ed., 2002) (describing the Special Criminal Court); see 
generally Liz Heffernan, Evidence and National Security: “Belief Evidence” in the Irish Special 
Criminal Court, 15 EUR. PUB. L. 65 (2009) (discussing the use of senior police official “belief” 
evidence concerning membership in terrorist organizations).  A second Special Criminal Court was 
established in 2016.  See First Sitting of Second Special Criminal Court, IRISH TIMES (May 6, 
2016), http://www.irishtimes.com/news/crime-and-law/courts/first-sitting-of-second-special-
criminal-court-1.2636993.  The continued existence of the Special Criminal Court has been 
controversial in recent years.  See FactCheck: Who Wants to Get Rid of the Special Criminal 
Court?, THEJOURNAL.IE (Feb. 10, 2016, 7:00 AM), http://www.thejournal.ie/ge16-election-2016-
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reserved judgment case before leaving the court for the long holiday.180  
At the end of the day, he and Carmel will drive to their holiday cottage in 
Cush—where “they spen[d] each summer recess . . . close to where they 
[were] born, where they were known.”181 
In court, Redmond quickly disposes of the motions and proceeds to 
read his judgment in the merits case previously reserved for decision.  In 
that case, a hospital has applied for permission to discharge “a 
handicapped child who need[s] constant care and would need such care, 
in the view of the doctors, for the rest of his life.”182  Redmond states the 
facts: the handicapped child is one of seven children in the family; the 
father is employed; the mother does not work outside the home.  He then 
discusses the legal precedents that counsel brought up during the course 
of the hearing and explains that there is “nothing in the Constitution” that 
explicitly or implicitly creates “an inalienable right to free hospital 
treatment.”183  Indeed, “[t]he state’s functions and responsibilities [must] 
cease at some point; the state ha[s] freedoms and rights as well as the 
citizen.”184 
As Redmond reads the judgment in court, “he became even more 
certain of [its] rightness . . . and began to see as well that it might be 
important in the future as a lucid and direct analysis of the limits to the 
duties of the state.”185  When Redmond finishes, counsel for both parties 
rise and ask for costs.  Without any particular reason, he puts over the 
matter of costs until the next term.186 
Tóibín describes at length the process by which Redmond has prepared 
his judgment, which rejects the parents’ constitutional argument, but 
contains an important proviso concerning the State’s admitted duty to 
provide adequate social services: 
It had taken him several months, the long afternoons of the spring and 
early summer in his chambers and then later in his study [at home] in 
[the South Dublin neighborhood of] Ranelagh, thinking through the 
implications of articles in the Constitution, the meaning of phrases and 
 
ireland-fact-check-special-criminal-court-2594422-Feb2016/ (fact checking Sinn Féin’s claims 
regarding the Special Criminal Court). 
180. TÓIBÍN, supra note 23, at 3–4. 
181. Id. at 5. 
182. Id. at 6. 
183. Id. at 7. 
184. Id. 
185. Id. 
186. Id. at 8.  In Irish practice, costs generally “follow the event,” that is, the losing party 
generally is responsible for paying the costs incurred by the prevailing party.  See, e.g., Grimes v. 
Punchestown Devs. Co., Ltd. [2002] 4 IR 515, 522 (Denham, J.) (stating that the normal rule is that 
costs follow the event).  See also HILARY DELANY & DECLAN MCGRATH, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN 
THE SUPERIOR COURTS § 23-02 (3d ed. 2012). 
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the significance which earlier judgments had given to these phrases.  He 
looked through judgments of the American Supreme Court and the 
British House of Lords.  He wrote it all down, slowly and logically, 
working each paragraph over and over, erasing, re-checking and re-
writing. . . . [H]e worked on his judgment in the same way as he had 
always worked.  He would find that a single sentence by necessity 
expanded into a page of careful analysis; then sometimes a page would 
have to be re-written and its contents would form the basis for several 
pages, or give rise to further thought, further erasures and consultation.  
Or, in the light of early morning, when he read over his work, the 
argument would seem abstruse, the points made would appear 
irrelevant, the style too awkward or too dense.  He would take the page 
and throw it in a ball across his office. . . . 
 
He realized as he wrote the judgment what it meant: the hospital would 
be able to discharge the child, and the parents would be left with the 
responsibility of looking after a handicapped son.  He added the proviso 
to his judgment that the Health Board should ensure, in every possible 
way, that the child’s welfare be secured once he was discharged from 
the hospital.  He noted the state’s account of the social services which 
the parents would have available to them, and he said that his judgment 
was provisional upon those services remaining at the parents’ 
disposal.187 
B.  The Second End of Term Decision Day 
The second decision day that Tóibín describes occurs on the last day 
of the term a year later, when, once again, Redmond will hear some 
emergency motions and then deliver a reserved judgment in a merits case.  
At the end the day, he will drive with Carmel to their holiday cottage at 
Cush.  The account of that decision day actually begins in the middle of 
the night before, when Redmond awakens and goes downstairs to his 
study.  His judgment, which is written in longhand as usual, sits on his 
desk.  “He wondered for a moment [whether] he should have it typed, but 
he was worried about it being leaked.  No one knew about it; even as he 
sat down to write it himself he did not know what he would say, what he 
would decide.”188 
The case involves the wrongful dismissal of an unmarried convent 
school teacher “in one of the border towns,”189 who has lost her job after 
becoming pregnant and moving in with the father of her child—a man 
 
187. TÓIBÍN, supra note 23, at 7–8. 
188. Id. at 83. 
189. Id. at 86. 
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whose wife had deserted him and their children.190  The case comes to 
the High Court as an appeal from the Employment Appeals Tribunal, but 
plausible constitutional questions are raised on the facts.  As Redmond 
sits in his study on the night before he will announce his judgment, he 
reflects: 
There was so little to go on, no real precedent, no one obviously guilty.  
Neither of the protagonists in the case [the teacher and the principal who 
fired her] had broken the law.  And that was all he knew: the law, its 
letter, its traditions, its ambiguities, its codes.  Here, however, he was 
being asked to decide on something more fundamental and now he 
realized that he had failed and he felt afraid.191 
“What was there beyond the law?” he wonders.  He writes “law” on a 
pad, and then “natural justice,” and “right” and “wrong,” and, finally 
“God.”  But that, too, does not help: 
[T]he idea of God seemed more clearly absurd to him than ever before; 
the idea of a being whose mind put order on the universe, who watched 
over things, and whose presence gave the world a morality which was 
not based on self-interest, seemed beyond belief. . . . He crossed out the 
word “God.”  He felt powerless and strange as he went back to read 
random passages of his judgment.  He felt a need to go to bed and sleep 
some more; maybe he would be more relaxed about his judgment in the 
morning.192 
Later, Redmond thinks to himself “that he would like to get into his 
car now and drive with Carmel to Cush and never set foot in the court 
again.”193  Indeed, contrary to the hope that he expressed in the middle 
of the night, the morning of a new day does not find him feeling more 
relaxed about the judgment than he did in the middle of the night: “He 
thought that he should read it over before going into the court, but he 
 
190. Id.  When Tóibín originally published The Heather Blazing in 1992, he included a slightly 
different version of the case that proves troublesome to Redmond on the second decision day.  
Instead of being a case about a convent schoolteacher who becomes pregnant and is discharged 
from her position, the case concerns a convent school student who is expelled after she becomes 
pregnant.  According to Tóibín, the original manuscript included the teacher’s case, rather than the 
student’s case, but a lawyer friend persuaded Tóibín to alter the text on the ground that the facts of 
the teacher’s case were too close to those of an actual case and would likely reveal the identity of 
the jurist who was the inspiration for Tóibín’s main character.  Many years later, after the judge 
had died, Tóibín published a revised version of the novel, substituting his original version of the 
case for that which appeared in the novel as originally published.  Tóibín recounts this history in 
an afterword to the revised edition.  See id. at 247–48 (describing the edits made to the case in the 
original 1992 publication, and the re-insertion of the original text pre-edit in the 2012 publication).  
See generally Tóibín, A Brush with the Law, supra note 2 (detailing further the background of the 
novel). 
191. TÓIBÍN, supra note 23, at 83. 
192. Id. at 83–84. 
193. Id. at 85. 
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could not face it.  He felt unsure about it, but as he left the house and 
drove into the city the uncertainty became deep unease.”194  Like the 
judgment Redmond delivered on the previous decision day described in 
the novel, this judgment is not the product of haste or inattention.  
Redmond had listened carefully to the testimony and the arguments of 
counsel for three trial days; he had taken “notes, asked questions, sought 
clarifications”; he had formed a strong impression of the character of the 
witnesses;195 and he had spent “six weeks working towards a conclusion, 
a judgment.”196  The judgment itself is the product of careful writing and 
re-writing: 
The line of reason in his judgment was clear, he thought.  It had not 
been written in a hurry; evening after evening he had sat in his study 
and drafted it, working out the possibilities, checking the evidence and 
going over the facts.  Even so, he was still not sure.197 
The unease and anxiety of the second decision day stand in sharp 
contrast to the judicial self-confidence Redmond seemingly experienced 
on the first.  The problem, of course, is the case itself.  On one level, as 
Redmond suggests, the case is not a complicated one: “[I]t was, he 
thought, merely a case of unfair dismissal . . . . It was simply his job to 
decide if the woman had been unfairly dismissed or not, if she deserved 
compensation, or if she should get her job back.”198  Presumably, there 
was an established body of law marking the difference between an unfair 
dismissal and one that was proper; a body of law governing the 
appropriateness of particular remedies in cases in which the unfairness of 
the dismissal had been proved; and, most important, at least from a 
judge’s perspective, a body of law laying out the degree of deference, if 
any, owed by a reviewing judge to a determination of the Employment 
Appeals Tribunal.  But these bodies of law are not sufficient to provide 
Redmond with a sense of “spiritual quiet” in this case, despite his having 
“spent three days listening to the evidence and the arguments and then 
 
194. Id. 
195. Id. at 87. 
He remembered how calm the [convent school’s] head nun had been when she came to 
give evidence, and how the teacher, too, had been direct.  There was a pride, almost a 
nobility in the way they spoke.  He realized this was one of the few cases in which he 
had ever been involved where both sides were clearly telling the truth and were not afraid 
of the truth.  Both women were sincere; neither wished to hide anything, except one had 
no job now, and wanted the court to right the wrong which she felt had been done to her. 
Id.  He also “remembered their faces, the teacher much older than he had expected, the nun younger-
looking.”  Id. 
196. Id. 
197. Id. at 85. 
198. Id. at 85–86. 
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six weeks working towards a conclusion, a judgment.”199  There is a gap 
between real life and the law. 
The case involves something more than technical questions about the 
proper scope of judicial review of administrative action, or even the 
correct delineation between proper and improper dismissals.  There is no 
law against living with a man to whom one is not married, Redmond 
thinks.  On the other hand, neither is there any explicit constitutional right 
to do so.  And doing so is hardly consistent with “the Christian principles 
outlined in the preamble to the Constitution.”200  Moreover, while the 
Constitution offers special recognition and protection to the rights of the 
family, “[n]o judgment thus far in the history of the Constitution and the 
courts had called what she was involved in ‘a family.’  It was, instead, a 
broken family.”201  Redmond continues with this train of thought: 
Her child would be illegitimate in the eyes of the state.  But she was not 
breaking the law by living with this man, or by having a child.  The law 
offered her the same protection as any other citizen.  Her rights under 
the law were only diminished when those rights came in conflict with 
another’s rights.202 
What were those conflicting rights, if any, in this case, and how were they 
to be adjusted? 
As the time for announcing his judgment approaches, Redmond 
continues to reflect on the case and the problem it presents: 
Counsel for the school had maintained that she was not fit to be a 
teacher in a religious school, that her personal life was in breach of the 
school’s ethos and articles of association.  Her having a child outside of 
wedlock was not the issue, but her continuing to live openly with a 
married man was.  She had been warned, he said, but she had continued, 
in full knowledge of her employers’ wishes, to act against them.  The 
parents of children under her care had complained, counsel for the 
school had emphasized. . . . 
 
There was no argument about facts or truth, guilt or innocence.  In the 
end he was not the legal arbiter, because there were no legal issues at 
stake.  Most of the issues raised in the case were moral issues: the right 
of an ethos to prevail against the right of an individual not to be 
dismissed from her job.  Basically, he was being asked to decide how 
life should be conducted in a small town.  He smiled to himself at the 
thought and shook his head. 
 
 
199. Id. at 87. 
200. Id. at 86. 
201. Id. 
202. Id. 
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As he worked on the judgment, he realized more than ever that he had 
no strong moral views, that he had ceased to believe in anything.  But 
he was careful in writing the judgment not to make this clear.  The 
judgment was the only one he could have given: it was cogent, well-
argued and, above all, plausible. 
 
He went to the window again and stood there looking out.  How hard it 
was to be sure!  It was not simply the case, and the complex questions 
it raised about society and morality, it was the world in which these 
things happened that left him uneasy, a world in which opposite values 
lived so close to each other.  Which world was the one that could claim 
a right to be protected?203 
 
Redmond walks over to the bookshelves in his chambers and takes 
down “his sacred text: the Irish Constitution, Bunreacht na hÉireann.”204  
The preamble speaks of “the Christian nature of the state” and 
specifically refers to the Holy Trinity.205  But how does one apply that 
language to a legal case? 
[Becoming] pregnant outside marriage and . . . liv[ing] with a man 
already married was clearly alien to Christian principles.  It had never 
been accepted in any Christian society, he thought, until he realized he 
had taken the argument too far.  What was a Christian society?  Had 
there ever been one?206 
To give meaning to the words of the preamble, one would need to be 
certain about the meaning of Christianity and the essential characteristics 
of a Christian society: 
He wrote down three words on a notepad: charity, mercy, forgiveness.  
These words had no legal status, they belonged firmly to the language 
of Christianity, but they had a greater bearing on the case than any set 
of legal terms.  If the teacher were merely pregnant, the nun had said, 
they could have forgiven her, but the fact that she continued to 
transgress—he wrote the word down with an exclamation mark after 
it—meant that they had to take action.207 
Just as he has assumed, perhaps incorrectly, that he understands the 
significance of the reference to Christianity in the preamble to the 
Constitution, he recognizes that he had assumed, perhaps also incorrectly, 
that he understood the proper meaning of “the family,” as that term is 
used in the Constitution: 
 
203. Id. at 86–88. 
204. Id. at 88. 
205. Id. 
206. Id. 
207. Id. at 88–89. 
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One other matter began to preoccupy him.  The family, according to the 
Constitution, was the basic unit of society.  What was a family?  The 
Constitution did not define a family, and at the time it was written, in 
1937, the term was perfectly understood: a man and his wife and their 
children.  But the Constitution was written in the present tense, it was 
not his job to decide what certain terms—he wrote “certain terms” in 
his notepad, underlined it and wrote “uncertain terms” below that—
such as “the family” had meant in the past.  It was his job to know what 
these terms meant now.  This woman was living with a man in a 
permanent relationship, they were bringing up children.  Did a man, a 
woman and their children not constitute a family?  In what way were 
they not a family?  They were not married.  But there was no mention 
of marriage in the Constitution. 
 
He thought about it for a while and the consternation it would cause 
among his colleagues, a redefinition of the concept of the family.  The 
teacher would have to win the case then, and the nuns would have to 
lose.  The idea seemed suddenly plausible, but it would need a great 
deal of thought and research.  It had not been raised as a possibility by 
counsel for the teacher.  Lawyers, he thought, knew that he was not the 
kind of judge who would entertain such far-fetched notions in his court. 
 
If he were another person he could write the judgment but as eleven 
o’clock drew near he knew that the verdict he had written out on his 
foolscap pages was the one he would deliver, and it would be viewed 
by his colleagues as eminently sensible and well-reasoned.  But he was 
still unhappy about the case because he had been asked to interpret more 
than the law, and he was not equipped to be a moral arbiter.  He was not 
certain about right and wrong, and he realized this was something he 
would have to keep hidden from the court.208 
When the time comes for court to resume, the courtroom is crowded.  
The press and public benches are both full.  Once again, there are motions 
to deal with before proceeding to his reserved judgment.  He disposes of 
the motions as quickly as possible and then proceeds to read his 
judgment.  As he does, he surveys the crowded courtroom: 
There were a lot of young women, he noted, and he presumed that they 
were friends and supporters of the sacked teacher.  He knew that this 
judgment would be news.  It would be carried on the radio and there 
would probably be editorials in the newspapers.  He would certainly be 
attacked in The Irish Times.  As he settled down to read the judgment, 
sure now of his conclusions, he thought about how ill-informed and 
 
208. Id. at 89–90. 
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ignorant the comment would be, and how little of the processes of law 
the writers would understand.209 
Redmond recites the facts and the contested points, and, as  
he . . . came near the passage which would make the result clear he 
found that he was enjoying the tension and noticed that he had begun to 
speak more clearly and distinctly, but he stopped himself and went back 
to the rigorous monotone which he had adopted at the beginning.210 
“When he had finished, counsel for the nuns was on his feet, his face 
flushed with victory.  He was looking for costs.  There was no choice, he 
could delay it until the new term, but it would be pointless and he wanted 
to [be] done with the case.”211  Counsel for the teacher asks that the 
application be denied, but, unlike the previous decision day, when 
Redmond put over the application for costs until the new term, he now 
follows the general rule that “costs follow the event” and “rule[s] against 
[the teacher] without offering any explanation.”212 
Redmond hopes to avoid the radio news as he and Carmel drive to 
Cush with Niamh and her baby, because Carmel undoubtedly would want 
to know why he ruled in favor of the nuns,213 and it would be worse with 
Niamh.  “He realized that he would prefer if they never found out about 
[the ruling].  It would be difficult to explain.”214  Redmond avoids turning 
on the radio on the way to Cush, but Carmel and Niamh listen to the 
evening news once they have arrived in Cush, and Redmond cannot avoid 
having to defend his judgment.215  He is challenged again when Donal 
and his girlfriend Cathy, also a barrister, visit on the following day.216  
Notably, Cathy does not join in the criticism of Redmond’s judgment.  
Although Redmond does not recall seeing her before, Cathy discloses that 
she was one of the lawyers for the sacked teacher—the junior counsel 
who spoke on the motion for costs.217 
C.  The Third End of Term Decision Day 
The third decision day occurs at the end of term a year later.  Carmel 
has died, the result of a stroke she suffered in Cush during the first 
weekend of the summer holiday the year before.  Once more, we find 
 
209. Id. at 90. 
210. Id. at 91. 
211. Id. 
212. Id. 
213. Id. at 93. 
214. Id. 
215. Id. at 96. 
216. Id. at 116. 
217. Id. at 116–17. 
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Redmond standing at the window of his chambers.218  On this decision 
day, Redmond will not be delivering a written judgment in a reserved 
case.  Instead, he will be sitting as the senior judge of a three-judge 
Special Criminal Court empaneled to hear a case of alleged terrorist 
activity.219  He would be taken to the Special Criminal Court under armed 
guard, in an unmarked police car with two detectives carrying machine 
guns.  The building where the Special Court sits is itself protected by 
armed soldiers.220  Redmond does not like being taken to court in this 
way, but there seems to be no choice, despite the fact, as we learned at 
the beginning of the novel, that, “[n]ow things [are] safer; things [are] 
calm in the south.”221 
Significantly, we learn that the fictional Redmond is one of the 
architects of the Special Criminal Court.  In the early 1970s, he wrote a 
series of reports for the government, recommending, among other things, 
“non-jury courts [be established] for IRA [Irish Republican Army] 
cases.”222  One of his reports had included a section in which he described 
the approach to terrorism taken by other nations—a section that he still 
“did not want . . . to come to light, [feeling] that it would be 
misunderstood.”223  In addition, he had included “a section on how the 
courts, in particular the Supreme Court, could become a difficulty for any 
administration trying to combat terrorism.  But this had been seen only 
by the [Prime Minister] and the Minister for Justice.”224 
The case to be tried involves three men who have been charged with 
membership in the IRA, possession of firearms, shooting at a police 
officer in the course of his duty, attempted murder, and resisting arrest.  
As the hearing begins, it becomes clear that it is not “a simple case.”225  
Redmond notices that, with respect to the attempted murder charge, there 
is no real evidence against two of the three defendants.  He decides, 
therefore, to interrupt defense counsel’s cross-examination of one of the 
police officers to ask the prosecutor whether he intends to pursue the 
attempted murder charge against all three defendants.  The prosecutor 
assures the court that he intends to pursue the case against all the 
defendants, but proceeds to drop the charges after the lunch break.  The 
 
218. Id. at 173. 
219. Id. at 177. 
220. Id. 
221. Id. at 3. 
222. Id. at 173–74. 
223. Id. at 175. 
224. Id. 
225. Id. 
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defense makes little headway otherwise.  For example, the defense argues 
that the arrests were improper because they occurred “north of the 
border,”226 but the court is not receptive to that argument. 
We are given little sense of what the evidence is, apart from 
Redmond’s observations that the key defendant “did not look like a man 
with strong political convictions,” and his testimony “had that guarded, 
puzzled quality as though he had been brought in from the street, as 
though he had never been involved in the IRA in his life.”227  The trial 
proceeds quickly.  “By half past three it seem[s] [to Redmond that] . . . 
the case could be decided very quickly. . . . He would give the first 
[defendant] six years, and the others four.  His colleagues, he thought, 
might want to give harsher sentences.”228  In conference, another judge 
begins to talk about the case as if all three defendants could be considered 
together, but Redmond quickly challenges that approach: “We must take 
the first accused . . . and the other two separately, as they face separate 
charges.”229  The three judges soon reach a unanimous result—the same 
that Redmond would have reached if he had been sitting alone.  With that, 
the case is over, as is the term itself.  Redmond would be returned to the 
Four Courts under armed guard and would then be free to leave for his 
summer holiday at Cush.230 
D.  Some Observations on Judging in The Heather Blazing 
Although Redmond’s judgment in the handicapped child case will 
have important consequences for the family involved, the judgment is far 
from noteworthy in terms of its legal holding.  The judgment might have 
broken ground if Redmond had construed the relevant constitutional 
provisions to preclude the hospital from discharging the child, but he 
 
226. Id. at 180. 
227. Id. 
228. Id. 
229. Id. at 181. 
230. Much more could be recounted concerning the aspect of the novel that concerns the story 
of Eamon Redmond the man, but Tóibín’s account of the third decision day effectively concludes 
the part of the novel dedicated to the story of Eamon Redmond the judge.  At the end of the term, 
Redmond returns to Cush for the first time since Carmel’s death and struggles to find his footing 
unencumbered by his professional obligations, which have proved a potent distraction from 
thoughts of his personal life.  He is restless, but “[h]e had nowhere to go.  The court was on holidays 
and the house in Dublin was too big and empty.”  Id. at 205.  In this part of the novel, Redmond, 
who is keenly aware of the void left by Carmel’s passing, begins to move, albeit slowly and 
somewhat tentatively, toward renewing his relationship with his family and with Cush itself.  In the 
weeks following the end of term, the law is largely absent.  Significantly, it is mentioned only in 
connection with Redmond’s decision to read some books on European Union law, an area that he 
has previously left to his “younger colleagues.”  Id. at 212, 235. 
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seems not to have seriously considered that possibility.  While Redmond 
is mindful of the heavy burden placed on the child’s parents, he thinks 
that finding a constitutional right in favor of the child would tilt the 
constitutional balance between individual rights and the state’s rights too 
far in favor of the individual.  The state, however, has conceded that 
substantial social services would be available to the parents in any event, 
and the wily old judge has specifically conditioned his judgment on the 
continued availability of those services.231  In other words, Redmond has 
been able to provide some (albeit incomplete) relief to the parents without 
making any new law.  This may be one of the reasons, we suspect, why 
he thinks that his judgment may “be important in the future as a lucid and 
direct analysis of the limits to the duties of the state.”232  The judgment 
is clear, but it operates only so long as the Health Board continues to 
provide the services that it has promised to provide.  Moreover, the Health 
Board has a strong incentive to abide by its promise.  The alternative 
might result in the entry of a judgment that recognizes greater obligations 
on the part of the state, as a matter of constitutional law. 
There are limits to what a judge can accomplish through wiliness, as 
the second case demonstrates.  In the case of the discharged teacher, there 
seems to be no middle ground.  Redmond must either base his judgment 
on the teacher’s constitutional rights—which would require an 
innovation in constitutional doctrine and perhaps “a redefinition of the 
concept of the family”233—or find in favor of the school.  The most 
plausible argument in favor of the teacher may be that the teacher’s 
termination is contrary to the constitutional protection explicitly afforded 
to the family, but the teacher’s lawyers have not urged that argument, 
presumably because they assumed that Redmond “was not the sort of 
judge who would entertain such far-fetched notions in his court.”234  
Perhaps they also thought that it was an argument that the Supreme Court 
of Ireland would not accept in any event.  Nonetheless, as Redmond 
thinks about the case, and the difficulties it presents, an argument based 
 
231. Id. at 8 (“He added the proviso to his judgment the proviso the Health Board should ensure, 
in every possible way, that the child’s welfare be secured once he was discharged from the 
hospital.”). 
232. Id. at 7.  Redmond’s approach brings to mind Judge Noonan’s description of Chief Justice 
Marshall’s opinion in The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825): “General question—particular 
case; the antithesis was not unusual for Marshall, who inclined to decide the big abstract question 
one way and give the losers on the abstract issue a victory on the facts.”  JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., 
THE ANTELOPE: THE ORDEAL OF THE RECAPTURED AFRICANS IN THE ADMINISTRATIONS OF 
JAMES MONROE AND JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 112 (1977). 
233. TÓIBÍN, supra note 23, at 89. 
234. Id. 
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on the constitutional protection of the family unit “suddenly seem[s] 
plausible,” even though the development of such an argument would 
require “a great deal of thought and research” and ultimately would 
“cause [consternation] among his colleagues.”235  Redmond’s discomfort 
with the outcome has kept him awake, but he finally rejects the possibility 
of further “thought and research” out-of-hand, not because the argument 
is not worth pursuing, but because, as the teacher’s lawyers have 
recognized, Redmond is not that “sort of judge.”236 
It is with some sadness that we hear Redmond confess that, “[i]f he 
were another person, he could write the judgment”237 in favor of the 
teacher and of an expanded understanding of the family.  But he is not 
“another person”; he will deliver the judgment he has written over these 
several months, reject the teacher’s claim, and his colleagues will view 
his judgment “as eminently sensible and well-reasoned.”238 
Redmond is uncomfortable with the idea of ruling in favor of the 
teacher because that would require him to act as a “moral arbiter” and 
“decide how life should be conducted in a small town.”239  What leaves 
him uneasy is nothing less than “the world in which these things 
happen[]”—“a world in which opposite values live[] so close to each 
other.”240  But surely Redmond knows that he cannot avoid acting as “a 
moral arbiter” or affecting the way in which life is conducted in a small 
town.  He must decide the case one way or the other, and, in either case, 
his decision will affect “how life should be conducted.”  That is the nature 
of his position as an interpreter of the Constitution.  Refusing to consider 
seriously the plausible constitutional argument that might be made on 
behalf of the teacher cannot save him from acting as a moral arbiter.  It 
does, however, prevent him from acting as a morally responsible judge. 
Redmond seems adept at walling off his private life, so that any 
empathy he might (or might not) feel for his daughter’s situation seems 
entirely separate from his consideration of the teacher’s case.  
Nonetheless, he is deeply conflicted about the judgment he renders.  It is 
a “safe decision,” plausible at a superficial level, and it will be seen as 
“eminently sensible and well-reasoned” by those who, like Redmond, 
will be content not to think too deeply about it, let alone explore all the 
dimensions of the constitutional issues, or ask hard questions about 
 
235. Id. 
236. Id. 
237. Id. 
238. Id. at 89. 
239. Id. at 88, 90. 
240. Id. at 88. 
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whether this is a result that the Constitution—or justice—requires. 
As Redmond “settle[s] down to read the judgment in court,” we are 
told that he is “sure now of his conclusions,” and he reflects on “how ill-
informed and ignorant” the criticism of his judgment will be.241  When 
Redmond catches the teacher’s eye, he notes that she has “the resigned 
look of someone who knew she was going to lose,” of someone who has 
been told that, “he [is] not a judge who would rule in her favour.”242  But 
perhaps it is, after all, his own sense of resignation that he perceives.  He 
may now be confident in the correctness of the result he reached, but it is 
telling that he hopes that Carmel and Niamh will “never [find] out about 
it.”243  The resignation is that of a man who is not the kind of person who 
could explore those issues and write the kind of judgment that gave effect 
to constitutional values.  It is the resignation of one who recognizes that 
he has not done what he should have done. 
In the third case, Redmond is not sitting alone, but as part of a three-
judge Special Criminal Court.  Redmond does not like traveling in an 
unmarked car with police detectives carrying machine guns to a special 
courthouse guarded by armed sentries.244  And he finds soon after the 
case begins that he does not like the way in which the case is being 
prosecuted.245  At the very least, he does not like having his time wasted 
(or his impartiality tested) by prosecutors who have no evidence at all to 
support some of their charges.246  We learn very little about the evidence 
in the case, but we sense that Redmond may have some doubt as to 
whether the first of the defendants (who gets the stiffest sentence) is a 
terrorist at all: 
He was a small man, in his late thirties.  He did not look like a man with 
strong political convictions.  And his evidence, too, had that guarded, 
puzzled quality as though he had been brought in from the street, as 
though he had never been involved in the IRA in his life.247 
Moreover, a possibly important jurisdictional question—whether the 
defendants were arrested in the republic or “north of the border”—is 
brushed aside.248 
As a result of this brief trial, two men are convicted of illegal 
possession of firearms, while the third is found guilty of attempt to 
 
241. Id. at 90. 
242. Id. at 91. 
243. Id. at 93. 
244. Id. at 177. 
245. Id. 
246. Id. at 177–80. 
247. Id. at 180. 
248. Id. at 180 
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endanger life.  They are sentenced to four years and six years, 
respectively.249  Redmond is effective in securing his colleagues’ 
agreement to sentences he thinks appropriate, but his initial suspicion that 
his colleagues might be looking for harsher sentences is not borne out.  
Redmond improves the integrity of the proceeding somewhat by causing 
the prosecution to withdraw the charges that lack any evidence to support 
them, but the proceeding otherwise seems perfunctory at best, and he 
does nothing to make it less so.  Redmond is obviously uncomfortable 
with the secret processes of the Special Criminal Court, but he does little 
to resist them.  Finally, in comparing the third case to the first two, it is 
striking that Redmond and his colleagues seem so much more 
comfortable in dealing with complicated issues of law and order than 
Redmond was in dealing with issues of law relating to family and social 
life. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
In The Children Act and The Heather Blazing, we see judges struggling 
with complex cases that present extremely difficult problems at the 
intersection of law, culture, and human existence.  In each book, the cases 
we learn about might be disposed of quite easily if the judges were willing 
to apply some mechanical rule, without digging—or thinking—too 
deeply.  The deeper these judges look into the cases, however, the more 
they think about them, and the more they try to justify their decisions 
(particularly by writing judgments), the more difficult and the more 
deserving of attention the cases seem to be.  These cases may seem 
unusually complex, and therefore atypical, but cases that are not 
unusually complex may not ultimately require judicial intervention.  They 
will normally be settled in other ways. 
With Fiona Maye, we meet a judge who wants to know the facts as 
best she can.  In the case of the Siamese Twins, she ultimately recognizes 
that the ordinary tools of the law do not provide a sufficient basis for 
deciding the case, but she finds a solution in the doctrine of necessity—
essentially a departure from law as we understand it.  That move allows 
her to decide the case (and be applauded by her colleagues), but it leaves 
her uneasy.  She has not decided the case with “spiritual quiet” and is not 
satisfied. 
In the case of the Jewish schoolgirls, it is her careful listening to the 
testimony of the father’s witnesses and the social worker’s critical insight 
that makes it possible for her to decide the case.  To rule in favor of the 
mother, Maye concludes, is less likely to interfere with the girls’ ability 
 
249. Id. at 180–81. 
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to decide for themselves how they want to live, once they reach the age 
of consent.  As in the case of the Siamese Twins, Maye chooses what she 
deems to be the less-bad outcome.  But even that ruling is not neutral; it 
represents an intervention on behalf of the mother’s values and against 
those of the father and his community. 
Similarly, when Maye first hears that she will have to decide the fate 
of a seventeen-year-old boy who is refusing to be transfused for religious 
reasons, her immediate reaction is to think about going to the hospital to 
question and evaluate him for herself.  She quickly puts that possibility 
out of her mind, based on deference to contemporary judicial convention.  
But after hearing the parties’ evidence and arguments, she decides that 
she must indeed listen to the young man herself.  There is no established 
protocol for doing so, and Maye thinks too little about what procedures 
would be appropriate.  Among other things, she is being asked once more 
to validate the values of one community over another.  It is not possible, 
as a judge, to avoid that.  All that she can do beyond that is to listen.  
Some may believe that Adam’s story does not end well, but is that 
because Maye did not listen well enough or long enough, or because she 
chose to listen at all? 
With Eamon Redmond, we meet a judge who spends many hours 
thinking about his cases; he spends much time preparing his written 
judgments, and he takes great pride in them.  He is also concerned with 
justice in some sense, as he shows in the case of the handicapped boy 
who will require hospitalization for the rest of his life.  He resists the 
possibility of a constitutional solution to the problem because he thinks it 
would unacceptably alter the balance of rights between the state and the 
individual, but he reaches a reasonably just solution by holding the 
government to its commitment to provide the family with an appropriate 
level of assistance. 
Redmond seems adept at manipulating the system to create reasonably 
just results, as he does in the case of the handicapped boy, but he has 
difficulty with cases in which the middle road is not possible, where he 
must be bold in the pursuit of justice.  In such cases, he finds that 
convention is too great an obstacle to overcome.  “If he were another 
person he could write the judgment” addressing the proper weight to be 
given the constitutional provision relating to the family in the case 
involving the unmarried teacher; but he is, tragically, the person he is, 
rather than another.  The tragedy rests not in his refusal to rule in favor 
of the teacher, but in his willingness to dismiss out-of-hand the 
constitutional argument that might well be made on her behalf.  As the 
teacher’s lawyers know—and his conduct confirms—Redmond is not 
willing to listen to that argument, despite his recognition that it merits 
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consideration.  He is uneasy, he says, living in “a world in which opposite 
values live[] so close to each other,” and he refuses to act as a “moral 
arbiter” or “to decide how life should be conducted in a small town.”  But 
his effort at abstention cannot insulate him from moral responsibility.  By 
refusing to engage the constitutional arguments that might be made, he is 
“decid[ing] how life should be conducted in a small town” every bit as 
much as he would be if he were to rule in favor of the teacher.  He has 
the authority to decide one way or the other, but no authority to refuse to 
engage the arguments on both sides. 
In the third case, that of the “terrorists,” Redmond is more than ready 
to challenge the prosecution on one issue: the fact that charges were 
brought against all three defendants, despite the absence of evidence 
against two of them.  But otherwise we learn very little about any of the 
evidence in the case.  We assume that this is true of the judges as well.  
They apparently wish to know, in Justice Holmes’s words, “as little as 
[they can] safely go on.”250  The trial itself seems perfunctory; the 
consideration the evidence receives when the judges deliberate seems 
even more so.  One has the sense that these three judges are simply going 
through the motions, making their moral stand, if at all, only at the 
sentencing stage, without having much engagement with questions of 
guilt or innocence.  The judges are content to treat the case superficially, 
as if it were a simple one.  Once more, we see Redmond manipulating the 
system to secure a reasonably just resolution, but that seems inadequate 
in this context.  Without a better sense of what the evidence is, however, 
we cannot begin to know what a reasonably just resolution would entail. 
The lesson that we might take away from our reading of these two 
novels, and from the accounts of judging they offer, has to do with the 
importance of listening, and, in particular, of listening to both sides of a 
question as thoroughly and as open-mindedly as the limits of our human 
nature permit.  That is particularly true, of course, when the questions 
presented are exceedingly difficult, law is sparse, and moralities 
uncertain or conflicting.  In such cases, it is not enough that judgments 
be deemed by a judge’s colleagues to be “sensible and well-reasoned,” 
let alone “elegant and correct.”  As Judge Hand has said, everything may 
depend on “the spirit in which [the judge] approaches the questions 
before him.”251  In other words, much depends on whether judges choose 
to “listen,” as we have understood that concept here, and on how well 
they “listen.”  Judges must give themselves existentially to the case, and 
success or failure ultimately will be judged as much by the quality of that 
 
250. BICKEL, supra note 12, at 230. 
251. Hand, supra note 9, at 12. 
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engagement as by the outcome of the case. 
Listening means finding the facts for oneself, perhaps not literally, as 
Maye did, but in the more general sense of attempting to learn as much 
about a case as one reasonably can, as Justice Brandeis aspired to do, and 
not dismissing plausible alternatives and legal theories out-of-hand, as 
Redmond did in the case of the unmarried teacher.  It means 
acknowledging one’s biases, intellectual and otherwise, to the fullest 
extent that one can know and understand them.  It also means trying to 
see things from another’s perspective, pondering what one has seen and 
heard, and discussing those things with others (in the case of collegial or 
shared decision making), so that one’s ultimate decision may be as fully 
informed as possible.  It also means pushing lawyers to grapple with 
relevant arguments that they may have overlooked or dealt with 
inadequately, but without crossing the line that properly separates the 
judge’s role from that of the lawyer.  It means thoroughly evaluating 
arguments and justifying one’s conclusions, and it means being open to 
persuasion.  To do these things is to risk having a profound encounter 
with other people, their ideas, and their problems.  If there is “spiritual 
quiet”252 to be found as a judge, that is its source. 
There are many obstacles, to be sure, to the actualization of this view 
of judging, in terms of resources, dispositions, and innate limitations; and 
this view of judging is one that can never be actualized perfectly or 
completely.  But neither those obstacles nor the fact that this ideal can 
never be fully realized should prevent judges from trying.  Above all, 
judges need to resist the temptation to make a virtue out of the obstacles 
that confront them.  In the world in which most of us live, being mastered 
by our biases is something that we must always try and avoid, even if we 
can never be wholly successful in freeing ourselves from them; having 
difficult conversations with those with whom we disagree is also 
something that we cannot avoid; and having difficulty coming to a 
decision in a difficult case is indeed a mark of conscientiousness, and not 
simply a character flaw or shortcoming.  That is true of all of us in our 
everyday lives, and it is no less true of judges in theirs. 
 
252. McCree, supra note 48, at 797. 
